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ARBITRARY DEATH: AN EMPIRICAL  
STUDY OF MITIGATION 
EMILY HUGHES

 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court has long viewed mitigation evidence as key to 
saving the death penalty from constitutional challenge. Mitigation 
evidence about a capital defendant’s life history, combined with other 
procedural protections, is thought to alleviate arbitrariness in juries’ 
decisions of whether a defendant deserves to die. This Article presents 
original empirical research studying that hypothesis. Interviews with thirty 
mitigation specialists who have represented over 700 capital clients in 
twenty-five death penalty states reveal that despite the Supreme Court’s 
hope, mitigation evidence has not alleviated arbitrariness in death penalty 
decisions. Instead, new arbitrariness enters the system through the process 
of gathering mitigation evidence and presenting it to juries. This Article 
therefore concludes that mitigation must be reformed if it is to succeed in 
eliminating arbitrariness in capital punishment decisions. Without such 
reform, the death penalty will remain unconstitutionally arbitrary despite 
mitigation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A capital jury’s opportunity to consider mitigating evidence is one of 
the critical procedures the Supreme Court has endorsed to alleviate 
arbitrariness in the jury’s decision of whether a defendant deserves to die.1 
 
 
 1. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193, 206–07 (1976) (identifying mitigation as one of the 
key components of the new death penalty statutes that the Court found constitutional); Craig Haney, 
Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 835, 835–36 (2008) (noting irony in the fact that Gregg explicitly identified “mitigation” as a 
key component of the “new and improved death penalty statutes that the Court found constitutional,” 
even though no mitigation evidence had been presented in Gregg); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate 
Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. 
L. REV. 1091, 1092–93 & n.9 (2003) (explaining that the principle that “a statute also must permit the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/3
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This Article presents original empirical research suggesting that the 
system of gathering such evidence about a defendant’s life history and 
presenting it to juries is deeply flawed. Interviews with thirty mitigation 
specialists who have represented over 700 capital defendants in twenty-
five death penalty states reveal that mitigation operates in an arbitrary 
manner.
2
 Mitigation has thus introduced new forms of arbitrariness into 
the death penalty instead of alleviating it altogether.  
After Furman v. Georgia
3
 invalidated existing death penalty statutes 
because unguided discretion had led to the arbitrary imposition of death 
sentences,
4
 roughly two-thirds of the states redrafted their capital 
sentencing statutes to limit jury discretion and thereby avoid arbitrary 
results.
5
 Without endorsing a specific sentencing scheme, when reviewing 
 
 
sentencer to consider mitigating circumstances as part of an individualized sentencing determination” 
“was at the core of the Court’s rulings”); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (discussing 
mitigation); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (same); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280 (1976) (same). As for the Court’s concern with discrimination, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279 (1987), the Court observed that even though statistical evidence “indicates a discrepancy that 
appears to correlate with race,” id. at 312, the Court was willing to tolerate some racism within the 
capital sentencing process because “[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our 
criminal justice system.” Id. The Court further noted that “[t]he discrepancy indicated by the Baldus 
study is ‘a far cry from the major systemic defects identified in Furman.’” Id. at 313 (quoting Pulley v. 
Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984)); see also Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 337, 347 (2009) (“In light of Furman, states were forced to examine their death penalty 
procedures before returning to the business of capital prosecution.”). 
 2. Consistent with other scholars, see, e.g., Haney, supra note 1, this Article uses the words 
“mitigation,” “mitigation evidence,” and “mitigating evidence” interchangeably. In addition, as 
explained in the methodology discussion in Part II.A, at the time the interviews were conducted thirty-
five states had state death penalty systems. 
 3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 4. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 294–95 (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that the “procedures in 
death cases, rather than resulting in the selection of ‘extreme’ cases for this punishment, actually 
sanction an arbitrary selection”); id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are 
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. . . . I simply 
conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of 
death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly 
imposed.”); id. at 427 n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing Justice Douglas’s concurrence as 
concluding that “capital punishment is unacceptable precisely because the procedure governing its 
imposition is arbitrary and discriminatory”); see also Dale E. Ho, Silent at Sentencing: Waiver 
Doctrine and a Capital Defendant’s Right to Present Mitigating Evidence After Schriro v. Landrigan, 
62 FLA. L. REV. 721, 736 (2010) (noting that Furman “imposed a de facto nationwide moratorium on 
the death penalty in 1972 because of the seemingly random imposition of capital punishment”).  
 5. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (highlighting importance of 
“a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and 
guidance”); see also WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
IN CAPITAL CASES 198 (2006) (“The two primary post-Furman reforms involved providing a penalty 
trial at which the prosecution and the defense could introduce evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances relating to the defendant’s offense and personal characteristics and establishing 
guidelines that would instruct the jury to make its penalty determination by weighing the relevant 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the states’ newly crafted statutes the Supreme Court noted that its concerns 
about arbitrariness were “best met by a system that provides for a 
bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the 
information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with 
standards to guide its use of the information.”6  
States interpreted this language to mean that capital sentencing 
decisions were unconstitutionally arbitrary if they were not guided by 
statutes that allowed for individualized consideration of the defendant’s 
crime (aggravating evidence), as well as individualized consideration of 
the particular circumstances of the defendant’s life (mitigating evidence).7 
States therefore redrafted their death penalty statutes to include 
consideration of both aggravating and mitigating evidence.
8
 As the Court 
reviewed these newly revised statutes throughout the mid to late 1970s, 
the Court largely concluded that because states had added consideration of 
aggravating and mitigating evidence, capital sentencing decisions were no 
longer arbitrary.
9
 Nonetheless, Justice Brennan vehemently disagreed in a 
strongly worded dissent in Pulley v. Harris, criticizing the Court for 
“deluding” itself by thinking that the death penalty was no longer 
arbitrarily imposed.
10
 
The interviews with contemporary mitigation specialists that form the 
empirical basis of this Article underscore the continuing relevance of 
Justice Brennan’s concern. The interviews reveal ways in which the 
imposition of the death penalty still rests on unconstitutionally arbitrary 
underpinnings.
 
 
These findings present a contemporary perspective that builds on my 
own prior research as well as that of other scholars.
11
 The Capital Jury 
 
 
 6. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. 
 7. Stevenson, supra note 1, at 1092–93 (“What was clear, in the aftermath of [post-Furman] 
decisions, was that death penalty statutes were not per se unconstitutional; that any such statute must 
guard against arbitrariness by establishing standards to guide the sentencer’s discretion; and that such a 
statute also must permit the sentencer to consider mitigating circumstances as part of an individualized 
sentencing determination.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 8. WHITE, supra note 5, at 198.  
 9. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Thus began a series of decisions . . . in 
which, with some exceptions, it has been assumed that the death penalty is being imposed by the 
various States in a rational and nondiscriminatory way.”).  
 10. Id. (“[T]he Court is simply deluding itself, and also the American public, when it insists that 
those defendants who have already been executed or are today condemned to death have been selected 
on a basis that is neither arbitrary nor capricious, under any meaningful definition of those terms.”).  
 11. For example, in previous research I discussed the specialized use of social workers as 
mitigation specialists on capital defense teams. By examining critical issues that arise during the pre-
trial investigation that mitigation specialists conduct, I explored the inherent complexity that the 
Court’s mitigation jurisprudence has brought to the death penalty arena. Hughes, supra note 1, at 341; 
see also John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Scott E. Sundby, Competent Capital Representation: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/3
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Project is a national consortium of researchers studying how jurors in 
capital cases make the decision of whether to sentence a capital defendant 
to life or death.
12
 Capital Jury Project researchers have interviewed more 
than 1,200 jurors who actually made the life or death sentencing decisions 
for more than 350 capital trials in more than fourteen different states.
13
 
“Despite the reforms inspired by Furman and approved in Gregg,” the 
Capital Jury Project’s research “demonstrates that jurors are not deciding 
who deserves the death penalty in the way the [United States] Supreme 
Court has held the constitution requires.”14 
In the same way that the Capital Jury Project has focused on jurors, so 
other scholars have focused on attorneys. Six years ago, Welsh S. White 
published a study based on interviews with thirty capital defense 
attorneys.
15
 White found that post-Furman reforms have heightened the 
importance of attorneys’ skills on the jury’s capital sentencing decision: 
the worse the attorney’s skills, the more certain a defendant will be 
sentenced to death.
16
 White further explained that because thorough 
investigation often differentiates the most effective capital defense 
attorneys from other lawyers,
17
 a capital defendant assigned a poorly 
skilled attorney who failed to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation 
is more likely to receive a death sentence.
18
 White concluded, “[T]here is 
thus no reason to believe that the post-Furman reforms have diminished or 
will diminish the extent to which the death penalty will be arbitrarily 
applied.”19 Even though White identified a critical link between a defense 
 
 
The Necessity of Knowing and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1035, 1065 (2008) (drawing on empirical data on mitigation to explore the nature of mitigation and 
how it relates to capital punishment and stating, inter alia, that “mitigating evidence is at the core of 
how our legal system structures the death penalty decision, and a juror who gives it voice is not only 
operating within the law, but with the law’s blessing”). 
 12. Extensive information about the Capital Jury Project, including a more complete description 
of it and a list of publications generated by the researchers working with it, can be found at 
http://www.albany.edu/scj/13192.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).  
 13. William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law’s Failure to Purge 
Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51 (2003) (describing number of interviews 
conducted as of the writing of that article, although the research has been ongoing and many more 
interviews have been conducted since this article was published).  
 14. Id. at 51 (describing the principle findings of the Capital Jury Project research and also 
contextualizing that research by describing the classic 1966 study by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, 
The American Jury, in which Kalven and Zeisel found substantial evidence of arbitrariness in the 
sentencing of capital juries).  
 15. WHITE, supra note 5, at 10.  
 16. Id. at 198–202. 
 17. See Sean D. O’Brien, Capital Defense Lawyers: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2007). 
 18. WHITE, supra note 5, at 198–200. 
 19. Id. at 199. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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attorney’s ability to use mitigating evidence at trial and the exhaustive 
mitigation investigation that must precede the trial, he did not focus on the 
process of conducting the mitigation investigation itself.
20
  
This Article moves beyond jurors and attorneys to look at mitigation 
specialists. Mitigation specialists uncover extensive information about the 
life of the capital defendant from the defendant’s family, teachers, friends, 
and almost anyone who has ever been part of the defendant’s life. They do 
this work to construct a psychosocial history, or life history, of the capital 
defendant. This life history helps defense counsel explain to jurors why 
punishment less than death is appropriate for the particular capital 
defendant.
21
 In addition to their critical importance during the sentencing 
phase, mitigation specialists ensure that attorneys methodically and 
thoughtfully integrate mitigating evidence into the overall preparation of 
the case, which includes pre-trial negotiations, jury selection, and the 
guilt/innocence phase.
22
 Indeed, a thorough mitigation investigation is 
crucial to all stages of a capital case and is not relegated exclusively to the 
sentencing phase or even to the trial. The investigation of mitigating 
evidence can sometimes lead to pre-trial plea negotiations in which the 
defendant agrees to plead guilty and receive a sentence of life without 
parole.
23
 Similarly, a prosecutor may decide to try the defendant for a first-
degree murder rather than for a capital crime because of something the 
defense learned during the mitigation investigation.
24
 
Despite the critical role that mitigation specialists serve, scholars have 
not studied their significance within the death penalty system.
25
 This 
Article fills that gap. Through in-depth interviews with capital mitigation 
specialists nationwide, this Article explores what mitigation specialists 
encounter as they investigate a capital client’s life history. For example, 
sometimes mitigation specialists have adequate funding to conduct 
 
 
 20. O’Brien, supra note 17, at 1069 (noting that “[i]t would have been helpful to hear how the 
dedicated lawyers portrayed in his book obtained the time and resources needed to assemble a 
competent defense team and thoroughly investigate the client’s life history”).  
 21. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 344–45. 
 22. American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 959 (2003) [hereinafter Guidelines] 
(“Perhaps most critically, having a qualified mitigation specialist assigned to every capital case as an 
integral part of the defense team insures that the presentation . . . is integrated into the overall 
preparation of the case rather than being hurriedly thrown together by defense counsel still in shock at 
the guilty verdict.”). 
 23. See Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death 
Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 679 (2008) [hereinafter Supplementary Guidelines]. 
 24. See Guidelines, supra note 22. 
 25. O’Brien, supra note 17, at 1069 (noting that even White provided “few details about the 
investigative process behind the successful defenses discussed in his book”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/3
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detailed investigations of a capital client’s life history, while other times 
mitigation specialists cannot conduct any investigation whatsoever 
because the judge will not approve their appointment on the case. By 
analyzing mitigation specialists’ experiences, my research develops a 
critical corollary to White’s thesis regarding the arbitrariness of the death 
penalty. My research suggests that because of the extreme disparity in the 
way mitigation investigations actually work, post-Furman reforms have 
not eliminated arbitrariness in capital sentencing decisions.
26
 
Part I provides an overview of Supreme Court and select state 
precedent relevant to the intersection of arbitrariness and mitigation. Part 
II presents empirical evidence from an original qualitative study of thirty 
capital mitigation specialists. Following a brief description of the project 
design and methodology, this Part describes what mitigation specialists 
encounter when investigating and developing the life history of capital 
defendants. The interview data from this research reveal that even though 
mitigation specialists strive to conduct thorough investigations, they are 
often thwarted in their ability to do so. Part III analyzes how the 
experiences of mitigation specialists contribute to the arbitrariness with 
which the death penalty is administered and proposes reform. It concludes 
that reform is necessary to enable all capital defendants, in all death 
penalty jurisdictions, to receive constitutionally sound mitigation 
investigation and advocacy. Unless such mitigation reform is achieved, 
sentencers will risk imposing the death penalty arbitrarily and therefore 
unconstitutionally.  
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CAPITAL MITIGATION 
In order to situate this Article’s findings within the historical context of 
capital mitigation, this Part begins with a brief analysis of some of the 
Court’s fundamental capital cases. This analysis is divided into two time 
frames: (1) the Court’s early post-Furman cases addressing mitigation, 
which span the late 1970s; and (2) the “second wave” of the Court’s 
mitigation cases, beginning in 2000 and extending through the last day of 
the Court’s 2009–2010 term. Following this analysis, the second section of 
this Part analyzes state court opinions to explore how two state 
jurisdictions—Arizona and Illinois—implemented the Court’s mitigation 
precedent.
27
  
 
 
 26. See discussion of cases infra Part I. 
 27. As Part II.B explains, infra, because the caselaw interpreting the Supreme Court’s mitigation 
cases developed in two very different ways in Arizona and Illinois, those two states are especially 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Supreme Court Cases: Mitigation as a Means to Temper Arbitrariness 
Furman v. Georgia is a well known per curiam decision overturning 
three defendants’ death sentences.28 Although each justice wrote 
separately, the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence later interpreted the 
opinions of Justices Stewart and White as representing the Court’s 
holding.
29
 Their opinions “focused on the infrequency and seeming 
randomness with which, under the discretionary state systems, the death 
penalty was imposed.”30 To this end, Justice Stewart noted the state death 
penalty systems at issue in Furman were unconstitutional because they 
permitted the death penalty to be “wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed.”31 
Similarly, Justice White bemoaned death penalty systems which provided 
“no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death 
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”32 In 
concluding that the death penalty statutes at issue violated the Eighth 
Amendment, Justice White’s final observation was that “[l]egislative 
‘policy’ is . . . necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized 
but by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly 
 
 
useful focal points to understand the divergent ways state courts interpret the Court’s mitigation cases. 
In addition, Arizona and Illinois have attributes that distinguish those states from other death penalty 
jurisdictions. Arizona’s large volume of pending capital cases dwarfs the number of pending capital 
cases in other death penalty jurisdictions. See Arizona Supreme Court Capital Case Oversight 
Committee Minutes 2 (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/74/CCTF/ 
Minutes/min09-03.pdf (documenting that during the first seven months of fiscal year 2009, Maricopa 
County alone had approximately 130 pending capital cases). In contrast to the high volume of capital 
prosecutions in Arizona, Illinois had a moratorium on executions from 2000 until 2011, when it 
officially abolished the death penalty. See Ariane De Vogue & Barbara Pinto, Illinois Abolishes Death 
Penalty; 16th State to End Executions, ABCNEWS.COM (Mar. 9, 2011), http://abcnews.go 
.com/Politics/illinois-16th-state-abolish-death-penalty/story?id=13095912. During its eleven-year 
moratorium, Illinois prosecutors continued to charge and litigate capital cases, although defendants 
sent to death row following their convictions for capital murder could not be executed. See Counties 
Use Illinois Capital Litigation Fund to Cover High Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2155 (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). 
 28. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). For further discussion regarding the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence invalidating state systems in which death was arbitrarily imposed and the 
relationship between the Sixth Amendment requirement that capital defense counsel reasonably 
investigate mitigation, see Paul Litton, The “Abuse Excuse” in Capital Sentencing: Is it Relevant to 
Responsibility, Punishment, or Neither?, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1027 (2005). 
 29. See Litton, supra note 28, at 1040–41, 1041 n.40 (citing Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion 
in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 658 (1990), wherein Justice Scalia observes the impact of Justice 
Stewart’s and Justice White’s opinions in Furman on subsequent jurisprudence).  
 30. Id. at 1041 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 658 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment)).  
 31. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 32. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/3
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conferred upon them.”33 The cases discussed below highlight how 
mitigation evolved as one of the procedural tools the Court approved to 
help alleviate arbitrariness in the jury’s decision of whether to sentence a 
defendant to death. 
1. Early Post-Furman Cases  
One of the first cases to reach the Court after Furman was Gregg v. 
Georgia,
34
 which allowed the Court to examine Georgia’s newly revised 
death penalty procedures. In upholding the constitutionality of Georgia’s 
capital statute and affirming Gregg’s death sentence, Gregg was one of the 
first cases to signal the importance of mitigation in the post-Furman era. 
The Court did so by noting that capital sentencing standards which include 
the concept of mitigation—as Georgia’s sentencing scheme did in 
Gregg—“provide guidance to the sentencing authority and thereby reduce 
the likelihood that it will impose a sentence that fairly can be called 
capricious or arbitrary.”35  
On the same day the Court decided Gregg v. Georgia, it also decided 
Woodson v. North Carolina.
36
 In contrast to Georgia’s inclusion of 
mitigation (as well as other procedures) as a way to make the imposition 
of death less arbitrary, North Carolina employed a different strategy: it 
made death the mandatory sentence for all persons convicted of first-
degree murder.
37
 In deciding that North Carolina’s mandatory system 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments,
38
 the Court explained: “[I]n capital cases the fundamental 
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires 
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the 
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable 
 
 
 33. Id. at 314.  
 34. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  
 35. Id. at 194–95; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 3, at 71 (The drafters of the Model 
Penal Code concluded “that it is within the realm of possibility to point to the main circumstances of 
aggravation and of mitigation that should be weighed and weighed against each other when they are 
presented in a concrete case.”). 
 36. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The Court also decided Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), on 
the same day as Woodson and Gregg. Roberts contains largely the same language as Woodson to 
describe mitigating evidence: “The constitutional vice of mandatory death sentence statutes—lack of 
focus on the circumstances of the particular offense and the character and propensities of the 
offender—is not resolved by Louisiana’s limitation of first-degree murder to various categories of 
killings.” Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333 (finding that Louisiana’s mandatory death sentence statute violated 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).  
 37. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286–87. 
 38. Id. at 287, 305. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”39 In other words, the 
Court struck down North Carolina’s system as unconstitutional because it 
did not allow for individualized consideration of the circumstances of the 
offense or individualized consideration of the character and record of the 
individual offender—the mitigating evidence. 
Two years later in Lockett v. Ohio,
40
 the Court sounded a similar theme 
when it invalidated Ohio’s death penalty statute because it narrowly 
limited the sentencer’s discretion to consider the circumstances of the 
crime and the record and character of the offender as mitigating factors.
41
 
The Court concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments “require 
that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.”42 In reaching this result, the Court stressed the 
importance of allowing jurors to consider mitigating evidence as a critical 
component of a constitutional death penalty scheme.
43
 
Read together, Gregg, Woodson, and Lockett highlight the Court’s 
early endorsement of mitigation as a component necessary to ensure 
“consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and 
the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally 
indispensable part”44 of death penalty procedures. At the same time, the 
Court’s endorsement of statutes that allowed jurors to consider mitigating 
evidence was not the same as requiring attorneys to present it.
45
 For 
example, as Professor Craig Haney has observed, even though Georgia’s 
newly enacted death penalty statute provided for the consideration of 
mitigating evidence—and even though the Court pointed to the statute’s 
 
 
 39. Id. at 304. 
 40. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 41. Id. at 589, 604–05. 
 42. Id. at 604 (footnote omitted). The Court stated that this applied to “all but the rarest kind of 
capital case.” Id. With respect to this clause, the Court explained in a footnote that it expressed “no 
opinion as to whether the need to deter certain kinds of homicide would justify a mandatory death 
sentence as, for example, when a prisoner—or escapee—under a life sentence is found guilty of 
murder.” Id. at 604 n.11. 
 43. Id. at 601 (“[T]o comply with Furman, sentencing procedures should not create ‘a substantial 
risk that the [death penalty will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.’” (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976))); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286–87 
(1976). 
 44. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. In Lockett, the Court found it “necessary to consider only her 
contention that her death sentence is invalid because the statute under which it was imposed did not 
permit the sentencing judge to consider, as mitigating factors, her character, prior record, age, lack of 
specific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor part in the crime.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 597. 
 45. Haney, supra note 1, at 851.  
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inclusion of mitigation as a component of what rendered Georgia’s newly 
drafted statute constitutional—Gregg’s lawyers presented no mitigating 
evidence on Gregg’s behalf.46  
This absence of mitigating evidence was in fact not an anomaly within 
the Court’s early capital cases. No mitigating evidence was presented at 
the trial underlying Gregg, and no mitigating evidence was presented in 
McCleskey v. Kemp,
47
 a case in which the Court denied McCleskey relief 
by finding that he had failed to provide sufficient statistical evidence of 
racial bias in his case.
48
 Likewise, in Furman itself, the defense presented 
no mitigating evidence. In all three of these fundamental capital cases, 
“there was literally no mitigation whatsoever presented to the jurors who 
sentenced the defendants to death.”49  
That the Court was not concerned with the failures of these lawyers to 
present mitigating evidence stands in stark contrast to how the Court’s 
mitigation cases would later evolve.
50
 It was not until twenty-four years 
after Gregg that the Court “finally reversed a capital case explicitly 
because trial counsel had failed to investigate and present available 
background or social history mitigation.”51 This 2000 case was Williams v. 
Taylor.
52
 Williams marks the beginning of the second wave of Supreme 
Court cases clarifying the importance of capital mitigation.
53
  
2. The Second Wave  
After the Court’s early post-Furman cases declared the importance of 
capital mitigation as a means to temper the arbitrariness Furman had 
denounced, a chasm existed between that recognition and what many 
attorneys actually investigated and presented in court.
54
 In Williams, 
Wiggins, and Rompilla, the Court took decisive steps toward closing this 
 
 
 46. See Haney, supra note 1, at 835–36 (noting that no mitigation evidence had been presented in 
Gregg, McCleskey, and Furman).  
 47. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  
 48. Id. at 313 (holding that “the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant 
risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process”); see also supra note 1 (discussing 
McCleskey).  
 49. Haney, supra note 1, at 835.  
 50. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.  
 51. Haney, supra note 1, at 851.  
 52. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  
 53. The cases in this second wave are discussed infra Part I.A.2.  
 54. See discussion supra Part I.A.1 (observing that the attorneys in Gregg, McCleskey, and 
Furman presented no mitigation on their client’s behalf).  
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chasm by showing that it would reverse a death sentence if defense 
counsel failed to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation.
55
  
a. 2000–2009: Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla 
Williams v. Taylor
56
 involved the death of a man authorities mistakenly 
believed had committed suicide until Williams confessed to the crime by 
sending the police a note from jail (where he was housed for a different 
crime).
57
 Although Williams had sent the note anonymously, the police 
quickly determined that Williams had written it and charged him with 
capital murder.
58
 In defending Williams at his capital trial, Williams’ 
counsel failed to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation because they 
“incorrectly thought that state law barred access to [mitigation] records,”59 
and because they relied on the fact that Williams had turned himself over 
to authorities as a reason not to impose death.
60
 In finding Williams’ trial 
counsel ineffective,
61
 the Court observed that defense counsel “did not 
begin to prepare for [the mitigation] phase of the [capital sentencing] 
proceeding until a week before the trial.”62 The Court ultimately concluded 
that the deficiencies in defense counsel’s investigation “clearly 
demonstrate that trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a 
thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”63  
The Court made similar conclusions in Wiggins v. Smith.
64
 There, it 
reversed Wiggins’ death sentence by finding that it was impossible for 
 
 
 55. See Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 853 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The lawyers’ duty 
to conduct a thorough investigation of possible mitigating evidence is well established by our cases” 
(citing Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452–53 (2009) (per curiam); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 
374, 387 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522–23 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
396 (2000); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984))).  
 56. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  
 57. Id. at 367–68.  
 58. Id. Williams’ note contained a reference to the unit of the local jail in which he was housed 
(the “I” unit). Id. at 367. When the police determined that Williams had written the note, they 
interrogated him about the murder and other acts he had confessed to in his note, and Williams 
provided further statements supporting his confession. Id. at 367–68; see also Hughes, supra note 1, at 
352–53, 353 n.81 (discussing Williams).  
 59. Williams, 529 U.S. at 395. 
 60. Id. at 367–69.  
 61. Id. at 399. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an accused must show (1) 
that counsel’s performance was so deficient that counsel was not functioning as the kind of counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and (2) prejudice, by showing 
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694–95 (1984).  
 62. Williams, 529 U.S. at 395; see also Hughes, supra note 1, at 352–53 (discussing Williams).  
 63. Williams, 529 U.S. at 396; see also Hughes, supra note 1, at 353 (discussing Williams).  
 64. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).  
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Wiggins’ attorneys to say that they had made a strategic decision to stop 
investigating mitigating evidence when they had not done enough minimal 
investigation to make tactical decisions about what to leave out and what 
to pursue in their mitigation investigation.
65
 Included in the Court’s 
analysis was its observation that “standard practice in Maryland in capital 
cases at the time of Wiggins’ trial included the preparation of a social 
history report.”66 Even though defense counsel could have easily secured 
funding to retain a mitigation specialist
67
 to help prepare such a report, 
they chose not to do so, and the Court included this failure within its 
ineffectiveness analysis.
68
 
In contrast to Williams and Wiggins, the final case in the trilogy 
emphasizing thorough mitigation investigation did not involve “defense 
counsel simply ignor[ing] their obligation to find mitigating evidence.”69 
In Rompilla v. Beard,
70
 defense counsel had made “a number of efforts”71 
to find mitigating evidence. These efforts included “interviews with 
Rompilla and some members of his family, and examinations of reports by 
three mental health experts who gave opinions at the guilt phase.”72 
Despite counsel’s efforts and despite the Court’s concession that “the duty 
to investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off 
chance something will turn up,”73 the Court found that Rompilla’s counsel 
had failed to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation.
74
 In so holding, 
the Court focused on defense counsel’s failure to examine a court file 
containing information relating to a prior conviction that the prosecution 
intended to introduce as an aggravating factor at the sentencing phase.
75
 
The Court then explained that had counsel pursued that investigative lead, 
it would have found further mitigating evidence, and it would have also 
been able to anticipate how to defend against the aggravating information 
contained in the file.
76
  
The reversals of capital convictions in these cases based on failure to 
thoroughly investigate mitigating evidence illustrate a significant change 
 
 
 65. Id. at 526.  
 66. Id. at 524.  
 67. The profession of a “mitigation specialist” is discussed infra Part II.B.1. 
 68. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; see also Hughes, supra note 1, at 354–55 (discussing Wiggins).  
 69. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 381. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 383.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 383–86. 
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from the days of Gregg, when the Court said nothing regarding defense 
counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence.77 Indeed, the Williams-
Wiggins-Rompilla trilogy has formed the cornerstone of the Court’s 
emphasis that conducting a cursory investigation of mitigating evidence is 
not enough: the investigation must be “thorough.”78  
While the mandate to conduct thorough capital mitigation investigation 
was clear through Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, until its 2009–2010 
term, the Court did not provide further guidance about what constitutes 
thorough mitigation investigation. It was therefore surprising when the 
Court produced a record seven opinions in mitigation cases in its 2009–
2010 term, six of which allowed the Court to discuss the contours of the 
Court’s mitigation investigation precedent.79 In no other term had the 
Court come close to writing opinions in so many cases discussing capital 
mitigation investigation.
80
 The section that follows highlights the import 
and interaction of these recent cases. 
b. 2009–2010: The Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 Term 
Six of the cases the Court decided during its 2009–2010 term presented 
opportunities to discuss what constitutes thorough mitigation 
investigation. These six cases also provided opportunities for the Court to 
provide guidance as to how lower courts should determine whether a 
 
 
 77. See discussion supra Part I.A.1 (discussing Gregg, McCleskey, and Furman).  
 78. See Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 853 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra note 55.  
 79. The seventh case, not discussed here, is Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010). In Spisak, the 
Court examined two issues: the constitutionality of jury instructions that required the jury to consider 
in mitigation only those factors that it unanimously found to be mitigating, and whether the defense 
attorney’s inadequate closing argument deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel. 
Regarding the jury instruction issue, the Court analyzed the totality of the jury instructions and decided 
that the state court’s finding that the instructions were sufficient was neither contrary to nor constituted 
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Id. at 684. Regarding the ineffective 
assistance in closing argument issue, the Court found that any assumed deficiencies in the closing 
argument did not raise a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance the result 
would have been different, so the state court’s decision to reject Spisak’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law. Id. at 687–88. 
 80. In the 2005 term, the Court decided one case that upheld the imposition of death if mitigating 
and aggravating factors weigh equally. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006). In its 2006 term, the 
Court issued four opinions discussing mitigation, but only one of these opinions—Schriro v. 
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007)—related to mitigation investigation. Landrigan involved a capital 
defendant who did not want his attorneys to present certain mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase 
of his trial and thus could not establish prejudice in their failure to conduct a thorough mitigation 
investigation. In its 2007 term, the Court decided no cases involving mitigation investigations. And in 
its 2008 term, the Court decided one mitigation case wherein it established that a state court could hold 
a rehearing to establish mental retardation without violating the Double Jeopardy clause. Bobby v. 
Bies, 556 U.S. 825 (2009). 
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mitigation investigation was adequate and whether, if it were inadequate, 
it so prejudiced the defendant that it warrants reversal of the defendant’s 
death sentence. Three of these opinions—Wood v. Allen,81 Bobby v. Van 
Hook,
82
 and Wong v. Belmontes
83—discussed how mitigation 
investigations were adequate or did not prejudice the defendant even if 
they were inadequate. The other three cases—Sears v. Upton,84 Porter v. 
McCollum,
85
 and Jefferson v. Upton
86—discussed case law and statutory 
provisions relevant to the potential inadequacy and prejudice of the 
mitigation investigations. This section analyzes how these recent cases 
reveal the Court’s struggle to clarify its capital mitigation jurisprudence. 
 i. Constitutionally Adequate Investigations 
Wood v. Allen, Bobby v. Van Hook, and Wong v. Belmontes all involve 
mitigation investigations in which the attorneys did not pursue or did not 
uncover some aspect of mitigation that was later discovered in post-
conviction litigation. Despite these shortcomings, the Court nonetheless 
found that trial counsel’s mitigation investigations were constitutionally 
adequate. 
In Wood v. Allen, Holly Wood broke into his ex-girlfriend’s home and 
killed her by shooting her as she lay in bed.
87
 Three attorneys were 
appointed to represent Wood—two had “significant trial experience” and 
one “had been admitted to the bar for five months at the time he was 
appointed.”88 The attorneys with significant trial experience then put the 
inexperienced attorney in charge of the penalty phase of the trial.
89
 After 
Wood was convicted and sentenced to death, the primary issue in the 
federal habeas proceedings was whether Wood’s counsel had made a 
strategic choice not to present evidence of Wood’s “mental retardation” to 
the jury.
90
 The federal district court rejected the state court’s factual 
determinations and found that counsel’s decision had not been strategic 
 
 
 81. 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010).  
 82. 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam). 
 83. 130 S. Ct. 383 (2009) (per curiam).  
 84. 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010) (per curiam).  
 85. 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (per curiam).  
 86. 130 S. Ct. 2217 (2010) (per curiam). 
 87. Id. at 845.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 846. 
 90. Id.; see Wood v. Allen, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1239 (M.D. Ala. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 542 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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and had thus constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
91
 After the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed,
92
 the Supreme Court affirmed by stating that 
under federal habeas law, the state court’s finding that counsel’s decision 
had been strategic was “not an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceedings.”93 In so 
holding, the Court discussed the factual discrepancies in the evidence 
presented,
94
 emphasizing that even though it might have been “debatable” 
whether counsel’s decision was strategic, it was not “unreasonable” to 
conclude that it was.
95
  
Similar to Wood, Van Hook also examined a limited capital mitigation 
investigation and determined that it was not unreasonable for the lower 
court to determine that counsel’s decision to forego certain mitigation 
evidence was reasonable.
96
 The murder in Van Hook came about after 
Robert Van Hook had gone to a bar that “catered to homosexual men, 
hoping to find someone to rob.”97 Van Hook approached the victim, drank 
with him for a few hours, then went to the victim’s apartment, lured him 
into a vulnerable position, and killed him.
98
 At the sentencing hearing, the 
defense called eight witnesses and Van Hook gave an unsworn 
statement.
99
 In determining that the limited mitigation investigation was 
adequate, the Court contrasted counsel’s actions to those in Wiggins and 
Rompilla. It found that “[t]his is not a case in which the defendant’s 
attorneys failed to act while potentially powerful mitigating evidence 
stared them in the face,”100 and that it was not a case in which such 
evidence “would have been apparent from documents any reasonable 
 
 
 91. Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 846. The facts the federal district court cited in support of this finding 
included that the inexperienced lawyer had written to an attorney at the Southern Poverty Law Center 
that he was “stressed out over this case and [did not] have anyone with whom to discuss the case, 
including the other two attorneys,” and that he had told the judge that “he would request further 
psychological evaluation before the judge’s sentencing hearing, even though the evaluation would 
come too late to be considered by the jury.” Id. 
 92. Id. at 847.  
 93. Id. at 849. The Court did not reach the question of whether counsel’s decision to forego 
additional mitigation investigation was “reasonable”—only that it was not unreasonable for the state 
court to conclude that it was. Id. 
 94. Id. at 849–50. 
 95. Id. at 850. 
 96. 130 S. Ct. 13, 19 (2009) (per curiam).  
 97. Id. at 15.  
 98. Id. (noting that Van Hook first strangled the victim until he was unconscious, killed him with 
a kitchen knife and mutilated his body, then attempted to cover his tracks by stuffing the knife and 
other items into the victim’s body and smearing fingerprints he had left behind).  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 19. 
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attorney would have obtained.”101 Part of the Court’s reasoning that 
counsel had complied with “prevailing professional norms”102 in existence 
at the time of the trial included a critique of the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on 
ethical guidelines for capital defense attorneys that had been published by 
the American Bar Association
103
 eighteen years after Van Hook’s trial.104 
The Court also stressed, “‘American Bar Association standards and the 
like’ are ‘only guides’ to what reasonableness means, not its definition.”105  
In contrast to Wood and Van Hook’s focus on whether the mitigation 
investigation was adequate, Wong v. Belmontes
106
 presented a different 
inquiry: the federal courts agreed that the mitigation investigation was 
itself inadequate but disagreed whether that deficient mitigation 
investigation had constitutionally prejudiced Belmontes.
107
  
Belmontes involved a murder committed in the course of a burglary. 
After killing the victim by “striking her in the head 15 to 20 times with a 
steel dumbbell bar,” Fernando Belmontes and his accomplices “stole [the 
victim’s] stereo, sold it for $100, and used the money to buy beer and 
drugs for the night.”108 Belmontes asserted that his attorney was 
constitutionally ineffective in limiting the evidence presented in 
 
 
 101. Id.  
 102. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (discussing concept of “prevailing 
professional norms”).  
 103. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 17. The Court also disagreed with Van Hook’s insistence that “his 
counsel were ineffective even under the professional standards prevailing at the time.” Id. at 18. The 
ABA Guidelines are discussed in more detail infra Part II.B.2. 
 104. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 16–17 (criticizing the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Sixth Circuit 
precedent for treating the Guidelines “not merely as evidence of what reasonably diligent attorneys 
would do, but as inexorable commands with which all capital defense counsel ‘must fully comply’”) 
(quoting Dickinson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
 105. Id. at 17 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Through Van Hook’s critique, the Court 
revealed its push-and-pull relationship with the ethical guidelines published by the American Bar 
Association. On the one hand, Van Hook illustrates that these guidelines may be “evidence of” what 
reasonably diligent attorneys would do. Id. On the other hand, the Court’s critique signals that the 
Court is at times hesitant to use the guidelines—even as guides—to determine prevailing professional 
norms. Id. at 17 n.1 (“The narrow grounds for our opinion should not be regarded as accepting the 
legitimacy of a less categorical use of the Guidelines to evaluate post-2003 representation. For that to 
be proper, the Guidelines must reflect ‘[p]revailing norms of practice’. . . and must not be so detailed 
that they would ‘interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the 
wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions’ . . . . We express no views on whether 
the 2003 Guidelines meet these criteria.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 106. 130 S. Ct. 383 (2009) (per curiam).  
 107. Id. at 384. To establish prejudice, the Court explained that “Belmontes must show a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have rejected a capital sentence after it weighed the entire 
body of mitigating evidence (including the additional testimony [Belmontes’ attorney] could have 
presented) against the entire body of aggravating evidence,” which would have also included evidence 
of an additional murder. Id. at 386. 
 108. Id. at 384. 
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mitigation.
109
 In response, his attorney explained that he had strategically 
narrowed his mitigation case because he did not want to open the door to 
allow the state to introduce evidence of a prior murder in which there was 
substantial evidence that Belmontes had been involved.
110
 The Ninth 
Circuit found that Belmontes was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 
performance, but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed.
111
 In holding 
that Belmontes had not established prejudice,
112
 the Court stressed the 
necessity “to consider all the relevant evidence that the jury would have 
had before it if [Belmontes’ attorney] had pursued the different path.”113 
The relevant evidence included not just the mitigation evidence that his 
attorney could have presented, but also evidence of the additional murder 
“that almost certainly would have come in with it.”114  
Collectively, Wood, Van Hook, and Belmontes illustrate the Court’s 
attempt to provide guidance to lower courts about what constitutes 
constitutionally adequate mitigation investigation. The next three cases—
Sears v. Upton,
115
 Porter v. McCollum,
116
 and Jefferson v. Upton
117—
illustrate the contours of constitutionally inadequate investigations.  
 ii. Constitutionally Inadequate Investigations 
Sears v. Upton involved an armed robbery and kidnapping that resulted 
in death.
118
 During the penalty phase of the trial, Sears’ counsel presented 
 
 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 386 (explaining that Belmontes’ attorney put on “nine witnesses he thought could 
advance a case for mitigation, without opening the door to the prior murder evidence”).  
 111. Id. at 388, 391. 
 112. Id. at 386, 391. 
 113. Id. at 386. 
 114. Id. The Court also observed that “[s]ome of the error below may be traced to confusion about 
the appropriate standard and burden of proof.” Id. at 390. It explained that contrary to what the Ninth 
Circuit had appeared to do, “Strickland does not require the State to ‘rule out’ a sentence of life in 
prison to prevail. Rather, Strickland places the burden on the defendant, not the State, to show a 
‘reasonable probability’ that the result would have been different.” Id. at 390–91. 
 115. 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010) (per curiam).  
 116. 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (per curiam). In Porter, because the Florida Supreme Court did not 
decide whether Porter’s counsel was deficient, the United States Supreme Court reviewed this claim de 
novo and found that it was. Id. at 452–53. The Court then examined whether “[t]he Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision that Porter was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to conduct a thorough—or 
even cursory—investigation” was unreasonable, and the Court found that it was. Id. at 453–56. 
 117. 130 S. Ct. 2217 (2010) (per curiam). 
 118. 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010) (per curiam). Sears is similar to Belmontes insofar as the inquiry 
turned not on whether the mitigation investigation was deficient, but on whether the deficient 
investigation had prejudiced the capital defendant. Also similar to Belmontes, the Supreme Court 
remanded after clarifying the correct prejudice inquiry to employ. In Sears, however, the Court’s 
clarification opened the avenue for potential relief for Sears, whereas the Court’s clarification in 
Belmontes foreclosed relief. See id. at 3261. 
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mitigating evidence “describing his childhood as stable, loving, and 
essentially without incident.”119 Seven witnesses testified about Sears’ 
middle-class background, how his actions had shocked his relatives, and 
how sentencing Sears to death would devastate Sears’ family.120 This 
mitigation theory then backfired when the prosecutor asserted in closing 
arguments that Sears was “privileged in every way” and had “rejected 
every opportunity that was afforded him.”121  
In its analysis, the Supreme Court’s opinion included extensive 
discussion about the additional information that post-conviction counsel 
obtained during their mitigation investigation. This discussion showed that 
in contrast to the mitigation theory presented at trial—that Sears was 
“privileged in every way”—Sears’ home life was “anything but 
tranquil.”122 The Court then reviewed the deficiencies in the state court’s 
inquiry by pointing to two main errors: (1) the court had “curtailed a more 
probing prejudice inquiry because it placed undue reliance on the assumed 
reasonableness of counsel’s mitigation theory,”123 and (2) the court had 
failed to apply the proper prejudice inquiry in part because it mistakenly 
believed prejudice could only apply in cases in which there was “little or 
no mitigation evidence.”124 Finding that the lower court had used the 
wrong prejudice analysis, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded.
125
 
To explain where the lower court had erred in its prejudice inquiry, 
Sears discussed the Court’s recent decision in Porter v. McCollum.126 
Porter involved the shooting deaths of George Porter’s ex-girlfriend and 
her boyfriend.
127
 Porter was sentenced to death after his defense attorney 
told the jury that Porter was not “mentally healthy” but did not put on 
evidence related to his mental health.
128
 During a two-day evidentiary 
hearing held during post-conviction proceedings, Porter presented 
 
 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 3261–62.  
 121. Id. at 3262.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 3265. 
 124. Id. at 3266. 
 125. Id. at 3267. 
 126. Id. at 3266 (discussing Porter).  
 127. Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009) (per curiam). Porter had represented himself 
for most of the pre-trial proceedings and during the beginning of his trial, then pleaded guilty near the 
end of the State’s case and changed his mind about continuing to represent himself. Id. His standby 
counsel took over for the penalty phase, blaming Porter’s actions on his drunkenness and putting on 
“only one witness, Porter’s ex-wife, and read[ing] from an excerpt from a deposition.” Id. at 449.  
 128. Id. (noting that Porter was sentenced to death for the murder of his ex-girlfriend but not for 
the murder of her boyfriend).  
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extensive mitigating evidence, including evidence related to his heroic 
military service and serious mental health difficulties, “all of which was 
apparently unknown to his penalty-phase counsel.”129 Such evidence 
included “[h]is commanding officer’s moving description of . . . two 
battles” in which Porter was wounded and later decorated for his 
service.
130
 The Court found that the state court had unreasonably applied 
Strickland’s prejudice prong131 when it analyzed and rejected Porter’s 
claim,
132
 noting, “[T]he Florida Supreme Court, following the state 
postconviction court, unreasonably discounted the evidence of Porter’s 
childhood abuse and military service.”133 
Through its analysis in both Sears and Porter, the Court highlighted 
that it has “never held that counsel’s effort to present some mitigation 
evidence should foreclose an inquiry into whether a facially deficient 
mitigation investigation might have prejudiced the defendant.”134 
Jefferson v. Upton
135
 also examined deficiencies in the prejudice 
analysis, this time focusing on deficiencies in the Eleventh Circuit’s 
analysis of the state court’s findings regarding the adequacy of the 
mitigation investigation.
136
 Lawrence Jefferson was sentenced to death 
“for killing his co-worker while the two men were fishing.”137 In vacating 
the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment and remanding, the Supreme Court 
included extensive details about the mitigation investigation that trial 
counsel had done, as well as details about what it had not done.
138
 The 
complex details revolved around the fact that Jefferson had suffered a 
serious head injury when he was a child and that trial counsel had failed to 
investigate this injury.
139
 When the state court decided to deny post-
conviction relief, the state court held an ex parte meeting with the 
prosecutor in which it asked the prosecutor to draft the court’s findings of 
 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 448.  
 131. See supra note 61 (discussing Strickland’s prejudice prong). 
 132. Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 454–55.  
 133. Id. at 455.  
 134. Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3266 (2010) (per curiam). In dissent, Justice Scalia (joined 
by Justice Thomas) found no error of law with the state court’s prejudice inquiry and predicted that on 
remand the state court will “do what it has already done: find no reasonable likelihood that the 
mitigation evidence the Court details in its opinion would have persuaded a jury to change its mind 
about the death sentence for this brutal rape-murder.” Id. at 3267 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 135. 130 S. Ct. 2217 (2010) (per curiam). 
 136. Id. at 2218. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 2218–23. 
 139. Id. at 2218. 
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fact.
140
 The state court then adopted the opinion the prosecutor had 
drafted—including all factual findings relevant to the adequacy of the 
mitigation investigation conducted at trial—without modification.141 The 
Court remanded so that the Eleventh Circuit could determine “whether the 
state court’s factual findings warrant a presumption of correctness, and to 
conduct any further proceedings as may be appropriate in light of their 
resolution of that issue.”142 
In summary, the Court’s 2009–2010 term illustrates the Court’s 
determination to clarify the contours of thorough mitigation investigation. 
The range of lower court disagreement about what constitutes thorough 
mitigation investigation is reflected in the variety of divergent lower court 
opinions as each case wound its way to the Supreme Court. The fact that 
the Court chose to issue six decisions in a single term—all with an eye 
toward aiding the lower courts in their determinations of what constitutes 
constitutionally sufficient mitigation investigation—is evidence of the 
confusion that exists among the lower courts and the Supreme Court’s 
attempt to provide guidance. 
The next section examines the divergent opinions among the state 
courts in more detail by analyzing recent opinions in two states. A close 
reading of these opinions provides further evidence of how state courts 
interpret the Supreme Court’s mitigation precedent in conflicting ways. 
B. State Court Case Studies 
The preceding analysis of Supreme Court cases shows decisiveness in 
the Court’s holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes a 
 
 
 140. Id. at 2219. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 2223. While Jefferson discusses counsel’s actions and inactions during the mitigation 
investigation, the decision ultimately turns on a close reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Id. at 2220–24 
(enumerating subsections (d)(1) through (8)). Section 2254(d) provides eight instances in which 
federal courts do not have to presume that a factual issue determined by a state court is correct. Id. In 
its decision, the Court critiqued the Eleventh Circuit for limiting its analysis under section 2254(d) to 
subpart (8) alone, pointing out that “there are seven other[] [subparts], none of which the Court of 
Appeals considered when addressing Jefferson’s claim.” Id. at 2222 (internal citation omitted). The 
Court then explained that the Eleventh Circuit erred by “not consider[ing] the state court’s process 
[i.e., its adoption of the prosecutor’s drafted opinion without any modifications] when it applied the 
statutory presumption of correctness.” Id. In dissent, Justice Scalia took issue with the Court’s 
conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit misapplied §§ 2254(d)(1)–(8) by treating § 2254(d)(8) “‘as the 
exclusive statutory exception’ to the presumption of correctness, and by failing to address whether 
§ 2254(d)(2), (6), or (7) might also bar application of that presumption.” Id. at 2224. Justice Scalia 
asserted that “[t]he Court’s opinion . . . is the first anyone (including Jefferson) has ever heard of this 
argument.” Id. 
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duty to conduct thorough mitigation investigation,
143
 and that mitigation is 
a critical component of curtailing the arbitrariness of death penalty 
systems the Court deemed unconstitutional in Furman.
144
 At the same 
time, the Court has not definitively held that capital defense attorneys need 
expert help to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation that comports 
with the Sixth Amendment. Although the Supreme Court’s mitigation 
cases have come close to recognizing such a right,
145
 the Court has left it 
to the states—and more specifically, to the state court judges and capital 
defense attorneys working within the states—to decide what constitutes, 
and how to accomplish, thorough mitigation investigations.
146
  
While it may be no surprise that the state courts undertake this task 
differently, the degree of variance across state jurisdictions is pronounced. 
Using state court opinions and news reports as sources of information, this 
section examines the variance in how two different jurisdictions—Illinois 
and Arizona—interpreted the Court’s mitigation precedent to decide what 
constitutes constitutionally adequate mitigation investigations. The 
contrast between these jurisdictions suggests evidence of continued 
arbitrariness of how mitigation operates within the states’ death penalty 
systems.  
1. Illinois 
While recognizing that thorough mitigation investigation is a necessity, 
some state trial courts have held that capital defense attorneys can simply 
do the investigation themselves. Illinois is one such example.
147
 In the 
 
 
 143. Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 853 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra note 55.  
 144. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 145. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (observing that the ABA Guidelines 
for the Appointment of Defense Counsel in Capital Cases have established “well-defined norms” in 
capital cases); Guidelines, supra note 22, at 952 (detailing the necessity of hiring a capital mitigation 
specialist).  
 146. See Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2009) (per curiam). 
 147. In light of the fact that Illinois officially abolished its state death penalty on July 1, 2011, the 
selection of Illinois as one of the two state case studies in Section B has heightened significance. When 
signing the bill to abolish the death penalty in Illinois, Governor Pat Quinn stated that the system of 
imposing the death penalty in Illinois was “inherently flawed” and that evidence presented to him “by 
former prosecutors and judges with decades of experience in the criminal justice system has convinced 
[him] that it is impossible to devise a system that is consistent, that is free of discrimination on the 
basis of race, geography or economic circumstance, and that always gets it right.” Press Release, 
Governor Pat Quinn, Statement from Governor Pat Quinn on Senate Bill 3539 (Mar. 9, 2011), 
available at http://www.illinois.gov/pressreleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=2&RecNum= 
9265. 
 Such observations are particularly relevant to the analysis in Section B, which explores the fact 
that various Illinois trial courts refused to appoint mitigation specialists to capital cases in Illinois 
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words of one Illinois trial court as recently as 2009, “[O]ur [state] supreme 
court has held that ‘a mitigation specialist is not crucial to the defendant’s 
ability to marshal evidence in mitigation.’ . . . Moreover, ‘a trial court is 
not constitutionally required to appoint a mitigation specialist, or even an 
investigator, because defense counsel is capable of obtaining and 
presenting such information.’”148 
This statement was part of an unpublished state court opinion, People 
v. Taylor,
149
 which denied the defendant’s motion to prohibit the state of 
Illinois from seeking the death penalty because defense counsel did not 
have enough money to pay for various aspects of the defense. The case in 
which this unpublished opinion was issued was one of some sixty death 
penalty cases with similar budgetary deficits in Illinois during the summer 
of 2009. Among the defense attorneys making similar lack-of-funding 
motions was Assistant Public Defender Jim Mullenix, who made headlines 
when he asserted he did not have enough money “to mount an effective 
defense” in representing capital defendant D’Andre Howard.150 
Because capital defense attorneys had no funding to cover “DNA 
testing, expert witnesses, mitigation specialists and other expenses 
associated with death penalty cases,”151 defense attorneys asked state trial 
courts to remove the death penalty from pending capital cases, thereby 
allowing the capital defendants to be tried only for a “regular” murder 
carrying a maximum penalty of life without the possibility of parole.
152
 
Stating that they would be ineffective if they proceeded to trial without 
funding to cover such critical expenses,
153
 defense counsel also asked for 
permission to withdraw unless they received the necessary funding or 
unless their client’s case was reduced to a non-capital murder.154  
Although denying the necessity of adequate funding to appoint a 
mitigation specialist, the state court in Taylor simultaneously recognized 
Supreme Court precedent requiring thorough investigation of mitigating 
evidence. While noting that “[t]he Wiggins court found that the mitigating 
 
 
because they believed that capital defense attorneys could conduct the mitigation investigation 
themselves, even though they were not trained to do so and did not have sufficient funding to do so. 
See discussion infra Part I.B.1 
 148.  People v. Taylor, 07 CR 18462, slip op. at 4 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2009) (quoting People v. 
Burt, 658 N.E.2d 375, 389 (1995)).  
 149. Id. 
 150. Barbara Vitello, Defense Wants Death Penalty Option Dropped in Triple-Murder Case, CHI. 
DAILY HERALD, June 30, 2009, at 9 (discussing case of D’Andre Howard). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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evidence trial counsel failed to discover and present was ‘powerful’ and 
that counsel’s investigation did not meet the minimum performance 
standards of Strickland,”155 the state court went on to distinguish its 
holding from Wiggins. It acknowledged that the public defenders 
representing Taylor were “arguing that no funds ha[d] been made available 
to retain a mitigation specialist,”156 then contrasted that with the situation 
in Wiggins: Wiggins’ attorneys had been allocated adequate funding to 
hire a mitigation specialist but had chosen not to do so.
157
 Despite the 
absence of mitigation specialists in both Wiggins and Taylor, the Taylor 
court parsed Wiggins’ holding to find that mitigation specialists are not a 
critical component of the capital defense team: 
[T]he [Wiggins] Court does not suggest that trial counsel should 
have retained a mitigation specialist. The Court’s holding was based 
on the narrow principle that “strategic choices made after less than 
complete investigation are reasonable” only to the extent that 
“reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation.” . . . The Court does not opine that trial counsel in 
Wiggins could not have accomplished a complete investigation 
notwithstanding the absence of a mitigation specialist—simply that 
counsel failed to conduct a thorough investigation.
158
 
By underscoring the fact that Wiggins did not hold that trial counsel 
should have retained a mitigation specialist, Taylor interpreted Wiggins to 
allow for the proposition that capital defense counsel can simply conduct 
thorough capital mitigation themselves.
159
 The Taylor court then bolstered 
this finding with Illinois precedent, finding that the “[Illinois] supreme 
court has held that ‘a mitigation specialist is not crucial to the defendant’s 
ability to marshal evidence in mitigation.’”160 It went on to assert that “‘a 
trial court is not constitutionally required to appoint a mitigation specialist, 
or even an investigator, because defense counsel is capable of obtaining 
and presenting such information.’”161 
 
 
 155. People v. Taylor, 07 CR 18462, slip op. at 7 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2009).  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. (observing that although “the Public Defender’s Office [in Wiggins] had made funds 
available for the retention of a forensic social worker, counsel chose not to commission such a 
report”).  
 158. Id. (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003)).  
 159. Id., slip op. at 4–7.  
 160. Id., slip op. at 4 (quoting People v. Burt, 658 N.E.2d 375, 389 (1995)).  
 161. Id. at 4–5 (wherein “the defendant’s ‘constitutional rights were not violated by the denial of a 
mitigation expert’ because he ‘was given adequate assistance to prepare and present his mitigation 
evidence,’ [which included] ‘the assistance of counsel, an investigator, and a psychologist for the 
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In short, by denying defense counsel’s motion,162 the Taylor court 
relied on what it perceived to be an opening (or silence) in Supreme Court 
precedent that allowed for capital attorneys to conduct the mitigation 
investigation themselves. The Taylor court then bolstered this finding with 
its own state court precedent specifically stating that a capital defendant’s 
constitutional rights are not necessarily violated by the denial of a 
mitigation expert.  
2. Arizona 
In contrast to capital defendants’ experience in Illinois state courts 
before the death penalty was recently abolished in Illinois,
163
 Arizona state 
courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s mitigation precedent to 
necessitate exactly the opposite result. The case of State v. Sharp
164
 is one 
such example.  
Kyle Sharp was charged with capital murder in Arizona in 1995.
165
 He 
was tried in 1996 and sentenced to death.
166
 The two attorneys appointed 
to represent Sharp did not seek the appointment of a mitigation specialist 
and did not conduct a mitigation investigation themselves.
167
 An attorney 
named Margaret Macartney was appointed as co-counsel on Sharp’s 
case.
168
 Neither she nor Sharp’s lead attorney had any experience trying 
homicide or capital cases.
169
 Despite her unfamiliarity with capital cases, 
 
 
purposes of securing, presenting and analyzing mitigation evidence.’” (quoting People v. Burt, 658 
N.E.2d 375, 389 (1995))); People v. Lear, 572 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1991) (wherein the court could not 
find “that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a mitigation expert” “[u]nder the 
facts and circumstances of the case,” which included the court instructing defense counsel to inform 
the court if it was “unable to obtain certain information” relevant to mitigation prior to the sentencing 
hearing, and defense counsel did not so inform the court); People v. Munson, 794 N.E.2d 155, 170 
(2002) (stating that a “mitigation specialist is not crucial to a defendant’s ability to marshal evidence in 
mitigation” and that “a trial court is not constitutionally required to appoint a mitigation specialist, as 
defense counsel is capable of obtaining and presenting such evidence”).  
 162. Id. at 10. After the Taylor court denied the public defender’s motion to withdraw as defense 
counsel, the public defender managed to divert money from other areas to cover the capital costs until 
the summer of 2010, when the public defender again informed the trial courts that it did not have 
enough money to defend its capital clients. See Vitello, supra note 150. Only $150 remained in the 
Illinois Capital Litigation Fund to cover the costs of capital litigation for the capital cases that were 
pending at that time. Id. 
 163. See discussion supra note 147. 
 164. State v. Sharp, Case No. CR95000271 (Ariz. Super. Ct. July 29, 2010).  
 165. Id., slip op. at 20–21. 
 166. Id., slip op. at 8, 30. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id., slip op. at 20. 
 169. Id., slip op. at 8 (noting that during post-conviction proceedings lead counsel testified that he 
“had handled four homicide trials—it is unclear whether he counted the Sharp case as one of the 
four—but none before the Sharp case,” and that co-counsel “had never represented anyone charged 
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Macartney testified during post-conviction proceedings that she had urged 
lead counsel to seek the appointment of a mitigation specialist, and that 
lead counsel responded, “[W]e don’t have them in Cochise County.”170 
She further testified that after lead counsel told her this, she “made calls 
. . . to learn more about a mitigation specialist . . . but [lead counsel] never 
authorized hiring one.”171 Although inexperienced in trying capital cases, 
Macartney believed it was important to investigate Sharp’s background 
and informed lead counsel that “a trip to Indiana was necessary to 
investigate Sharp’s background.”172 Despite her insistence, lead counsel 
“would not authorize the trip, being (in Ms. Macartney’s estimation) more 
concerned with pleasing the Board of Supervisors by not exceeding his 
budget.”173 
Based on this and other evidence, the state court’s findings of fact 
included that lead counsel “never sought nor obtained funds to conduct a 
mitigation investigation or to hire a mitigation specialist.”174 The court 
further found that lead counsel “had not conducted, nor had he hired 
anyone else to conduct, a mitigation investigation that would have 
revealed the full extent of [the defendant’s childhood] history.”175 
In vacating Sharp’s death sentence,176 the Arizona state court made 
several conclusions of law that differ from the Illinois state court’s 
interpretation of the same issue. While the state courts in Illinois and 
Arizona both agreed that “[a] reasonably thorough mitigation investigation 
[is] required for defense counsel in a capital case to satisfy prevailing 
professional norms for representation of capital clients,”177 they disagreed 
on whether thorough mitigation investigation necessitates hiring a 
mitigation specialist. In contrast to the Illinois state court that found it 
constitutional to force defense counsel to continue to represent a capital 
defendant without funding to hire a mitigation specialist,
178
 the Arizona 
state court found that “[f]or defense counsel in a capital case in the State of 
 
 
with homicide, either in pretrial proceedings or at trial” before being assigned to Sharp’s case).  
 170. Id., slip op. at 22. 
 171. Id., slip op. at 22–23. 
 172. Id., slip op. at 22.  
 173. Id. (further observing that “[w]ithout making any estimate of the probable cost of a trip to 
Indiana, [lead counsel] told Ms. Macartney: ‘We can’t afford that [the proposed Indiana trip]. This is 
Cochise County.’”).  
 174. Id., slip op. at 23. 
 175. Id., slip op. at 29. 
 176. Id., slip op. at 50. In addition to vacating Sharp’s death sentence, the court also set the case 
“for further appropriate proceedings to determine whether a sentence of death shall again be imposed.” 
Id. 
 177. Id., slip op. at 44; see also supra note 161. 
 178. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
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Arizona, including Cochise County, to satisfy prevailing professional 
norms, counsel was obligated to obtain the services of a mitigation 
specialist . . . .”179 It based this conclusion on Supreme Court precedent, 
Arizona precedent, and on evidence presented during post-conviction 
proceedings. 
In terms of Supreme Court precedent, the Arizona court observed that 
“Van Hook and Porter, and the long line of cases upon which they both 
rely, make it abundantly clear that someone on the defense team must do a 
proper mitigation investigation.”180 The court also acknowledged that it 
was “not aware of a United States Supreme Court decision that 
specifically states that a mitigation specialist must be on board to conduct 
that investigation.”181 Whereas the Illinois court interpreted such silence in 
Supreme Court precedent as an opening to allow defense counsel to 
conduct the mitigation investigation themselves, the Arizona court found 
two passages in the Court’s cases to be “suggestive” of needing a 
mitigation specialist.
182
 The first was that one of the actions taken in Van 
Hook that “the Supreme Court considered to be evidence of the adequacy 
of [defense counsel’s] mitigation preparation in the mid-1980s was an 
effort to hire a mitigation specialist five weeks before trial began.”183 The 
second was that “one of the numerous deficiencies displayed by 
[Wiggins’] trial defense counsel . . . was their failure to employ a forensic 
social worker to prepare a social history of the defendant, even though 
funds were available to do so.”184 
After noting these two “suggestive” passages, the Sharp court observed 
there was “no need for this court to rely on mere suggestions that a 
mitigation investigation performed by a qualified specialist was required 
. . . .”185 It went on to discuss an Arizona Supreme Court case, State v. 
Bocharski.
186
 The Sharp court noted that the “authorities cited in 
[Bocharski] demonstrate that the Arizona Supreme Court believed that an 
adequately-funded mitigation investigation was a constitutionally-required 
and essential defense tool.”187 Based on this observation, the Sharp court 
 
 
 179. State v. Sharp, Case No. CR95000271, slip op. at 44–45 (Ariz. Super. Ct. July 29, 2010). 
 180. Id., slip op. at 14. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 18 (2009) (per curiam)). 
 184. Id. (noting that “[t]he term ‘forensic social worker’ as used in Wiggins appears to describe a 
person who does much, if not all, of the work that a ‘mitigation specialist’ would be expected to do” 
(quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003))).  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id., slip op. at 14–15 (discussing State v. Bocharski, 22 P.3d 43 (Ariz. 2001)). 
 187. Id., slip op. at 15 (footnote omitted). 
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concluded that “[i]f, in the mid-1990s, it was a constitutionally-required 
and essential defense tool in Yavapai County (where Bocharski was tried, 
convicted, and sentenced), then it was also a constitutionally-required and 
essential defense tool in Cochise County (where Sharp was tried, 
convicted, and sentenced).”188  
By finding that a mitigation specialist was constitutionally “required” 
in order for defense counsel to conduct a thorough mitigation 
investigation, the Arizona state court reached a decidedly different result 
than the Illinois state court. These two case studies provide a window 
through which to see how state courts have interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s precedent, as well as their own state precedent, in divergent ways.  
The research presented in Part II broadens the lens of study from the 
two case studies analyzed above to a nationwide focus. Collectively, the 
thirty mitigation specialists interviewed in Part II have helped to represent 
over 700 capital clients in twenty-five states with state death penalty 
systems. Their experiences provide a lens through which to further analyze 
the impact of mitigation within the nation’s death penalty systems.  
II. EXPERIENCES OF CAPITAL MITIGATION SPECIALISTS 
This Part presents findings from interviews with thirty capital 
mitigation specialists. Following a brief description of the project design 
and methodology, it describes the mitigation specialists’ experiences 
investigating and developing the social history of capital defendants. The 
interview data from this qualitative study reveal that even though 
mitigation specialists strive to conduct thorough investigations in order to 
help capital defense attorneys provide effective assistance of counsel, they 
are often thwarted in their ability to do so.  
A. Empirical Study Design 
The data for this study is derived from in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with thirty mitigation specialists who have worked on capital 
defense teams across the United States.
189
 The thirty mitigation specialists 
 
 
 188. Id. In addition to relying on Supreme Court precedent and Arizona state precedent, the Sharp 
court also found that the prosecution had presented no credible evidence that a mitigation specialist 
was not required. Id.  
 189. As Professor Margareth Etienne has explained, “Interviews play a critical role in data 
collection in grounded theory studies. It is recommended that grounded theorists interview twenty to 
thirty respondents in order to develop a reliable model or theory with adequate categorization of 
findings and adequately categorize these findings.” Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause 
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include fifteen people who are employed full-time by state or federal 
public defender offices, as well as fifteen people who work as private 
mitigation specialists.
190
  
The thirty mitigation specialists interviewed for this study have worked 
on capital defense teams representing over 700 capital clients in twenty-
five different states.
191
 Prior to each interview, the mitigation specialists 
were told that neither their names nor the states in which they live or in 
which they have worked as capital mitigation specialists would be 
revealed in this study. 
Each mitigation specialist was asked to complete a short questionnaire 
prior to the interview. The interviews, lasting an average of approximately 
seventy-five minutes each, explored each participant’s experience working 
as a mitigation specialist. Participants were given the option of having the 
interview audiotaped, and all but three of the participants agreed to be 
audiotaped. Each audiotaped interview was transcribed. While the 
interviews covered various topics, each respondent was interviewed in 
some depth about difficulties they have experienced working as a capital 
mitigation specialist, as well as their suggestions for improvements. 
The mitigation specialists interviewed for this study were identified in 
“snowball” fashion,192 starting initially with a list of mitigation specialists 
working privately or in public defender offices in three different states. 
When I interviewed mitigation specialists who were employed by public 
 
 
Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1207 n.33 (2005) (citing JOHN W. CRESWELL, QUALITATIVE INQUIRY AND 
RESEARCH DESIGN: CHOOSING AMONG FIVE TRADITIONS 56 (1998)).  
 190. For the purposes of this Article, the term “private mitigation specialist” describes those 
people who are not salaried employees of state or federal public defender public offices. Private 
mitigation specialists may contract with public defender offices on a case-by-case basis, but they are 
not regularly employed by a public defender office. Private mitigation specialists may also contract 
with private criminal defense attorneys on a case-by-case basis.  
 191. At the time these interviews were conducted, thirty-five states had state death penalty 
systems. The difference between the number of mitigation specialists interviewed and the number of 
states in which they have worked reflects several factors. These include the fact that private mitigation 
specialists often work on capital defense teams in jurisdictions outside their state of residence, that 
private mitigation specialists often work in numerous jurisdictions, and that there is some movement 
between the private and public spheres during the course of a person’s career. 
 192. Professor Etienne, who also identified her participants in similar “snowball” fashion, has 
explained that “[u]sing a ‘snowball’ or ‘chain’ is one of several accepted methods of obtaining a 
reliable subject sample in qualitative research.” Etienne, supra note 189, at 1202 n.24. She further 
explained that such methodology “involves selecting an initial group of participants who help identify 
additional participants,” and that “[s]nowballing allows the researcher to ‘identif[y] cases of interest 
from people who know people who know what cases are information-rich.’” Id. (quoting MATTHEW B. 
MILES & MICHAEL A. HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: A SOURCEBOOK OF NEW 
METHODS 28 (2d ed. 1994)).  
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defender offices, I obtained permission from their supervisor to contact the 
mitigation specialist prior to conducting the interview.  
I contacted each mitigation specialist from an initial list by phone or by 
email seeking an interview. All but two of the people I initially contacted 
agreed to be interviewed. After every interview, I asked each mitigation 
specialist for the names of other mitigation specialists—not necessarily 
residing in their same state or working in their same office—who might be 
willing to be interviewed. I then contacted these mitigation specialists by 
mentioning the name of the mitigation specialist who had referred me if 
that mitigation specialist had given me permission to do so. I continued to 
obtain new names of potential interviewees in this snowball fashion until I 
had interviewed the thirty mitigation specialists who form the basis of the 
data in this Article. I conducted eleven of the interviews by phone and 
nineteen of the interviews in person.  
The sample of mitigation specialists interviewed in this study is not 
designed to be statistically representative of all mitigation specialists 
working in the United States. Similar to other qualitative studies, my goal 
was to obtain a better understanding of the experiences of capital 
mitigation specialists, rather than to identify a statistically representative 
randomized sample.
193
  
Each of the interviews included extensive discussion about the capital 
mitigation specialist’s experiences. Interviewees discussed with great 
detail and candor their observations of how capital mitigation is working 
well on the ground, as well as substantive hurdles they have encountered 
or observed in their work. I combed the transcripts and my handwritten 
notes to identify and categorize their observations and experiences. The 
observations and experiences that mitigation specialists described are 
grouped into two categories: (1) the hope of mitigation and (2) the fiction 
of mitigation. Each category is discussed below.  
 
 
 193. Professor Etienne explains a similar methodology and lists other qualitative studies that have 
appeared in legal journals, such as “Albert W. Alshuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1181 (1975) (explaining that the usefulness of qualitative studies lies 
not in obtaining a scientific measure of a problem but in helping to ‘guide analysis and to permit an 
evaluation of the inherency of the problems’)” and “Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the 
Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 278–79 (2001) (reporting that his 
qualitative study, consisting of interviews of thirty-nine attorneys, was conducted with the goal of in-
depth exploration of case selection, management, and settlement strategies rather than arrival at a 
quantitative measure of specific variables).” Etienne, supra note 189, at 1206 n.32. 
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B. The Hope of Mitigation 
During the interviews, the mitigation specialists discussed a range of 
experiences. Across their varied accounts, two areas emerged as especially 
relevant for considering the Court’s hope that mitigation would decrease 
the arbitrariness of the death penalty. These two areas are: (1) the 
development of capital mitigation specialists as a profession and (2) the 
role of the ABA Guidelines in establishing prevailing professional norms 
for thorough mitigation investigation. While overlap exists between the 
two areas, to the extent possible, each area is discussed individually.  
1. The Professionalization of Capital Mitigation  
When the Court dismantled existing death penalty statutes through 
Furman and highlighted the importance of mitigation in Gregg, Woodson, 
and Lockett,
194
 the field of capital mitigation began to evolve. Indeed, the 
concept of a “mitigation specialist” is a relatively new term with which 
few of the interviewees were familiar before they stumbled into 
discovering the job. One interviewee described learning about capital 
mitigation as follows: 
We got our first case, a death case, and my partner at the time (one 
of the brightest guys I ever knew) and I said this seems so weighted 
for the prosecution. When does the defendant get a break? He 
started researching, and I started researching, and of course what do 
we find? Lockett v. Ohio. We started talking to people about [the 
fact that] there’s got to be a way to get the lawyers to realize that 
they need to do more than say, “He’s a good boy.” That same year, I 
just started calling people and luckily found the National 
Association of Sentencing Advocates. I joined immediately and 
started going to their seminars. I started doing legal research and 
had a lawyer friend help me, and read everything I could, all the big 
ones from the old days . . . . I paid for myself a trip to . . . a 
seminar—well, nobody ever paid for me to go to one for fifteen 
years. I did it all myself. . . . But we did the mitigation insofar as we 
understood it at that time. And then I kept doing it on my own and 
telling the funding agency here you’ve got to do it, you’ve got to do 
it, and they looked at me like I’d lost my mind . . . . And I took the 
 
 
 194. See discussion supra Part I.A.1. 
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name mitigation specialist because “investigator” was getting me 
nowhere.
195
  
The description of stumbling upon the field of mitigation and teaching 
oneself what it involved resonated across many of the interviews.
196
 
Perhaps it is not surprising that people who were among the first in the 
country to work as capital mitigation specialists discovered mitigation by 
chance and had to teach themselves what it was.
197
 More surprising is the 
fact that mitigation remains a relatively unknown field and that people 
who recently became capital mitigation specialists also describe 
discovering the profession by chance. For example, an interviewee who 
has been working as a capital mitigation specialist for less than six years 
described how she discovered the job opening: 
I was on this, believe it or not, I was on this email list . . . and I saw 
this [mitigation specialist] job advertised, never heard of it, never 
even thought of it, never even been introduced [to it] in schools of 
social work as a place to do some work. So I applied and I got it.
198
 
Another interviewee described the experience of moving to a new state 
several years ago and discovering the field of mitigation through a chance 
conversation at a party: 
[A]t that point I did not have a job, and we were just at a party, and 
there was a judge who . . . asked me about my background. He said 
they really need people to do mitigation. . . . So I put in the 
[application], and before it was even approved I had a case. One 
thing was—I speak Spanish, and surprisingly I was the only one for 
a number of years. So I’ve worked with a number of Mexican 
nationals.
199
  
While none of the interviewees entered their post-college careers with the 
intent to do mitigation, once they discovered the field, some specifically 
sought further post-graduate education because the mitigation specialist 
jobs for which they wanted to apply required a master’s degree. In the 
words of an interviewee who was working in a public defender’s office 
 
 
 195. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 24, at 1. 
 196. See, e.g., Interview with Mitigation Specialist 25, at 1 (“There was an ad in the paper [for a 
mitigation specialist.] I answered it, and I was hired.”).  
 197. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 8.  
 198. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 50, at 2. 
 199. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 18, at 1. 
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and was encouraged to obtain a master’s degree in order to be competitive 
for the position: 
I had to wait for a little while. [My supervisor] encouraged me to 
get my master’s because they wouldn’t put me in [the mitigation 
specialist] position without my master’s. But they didn’t specify 
what the degree had to be in. So I talked to people; they all said 
social work. . . . But others said no, it wasn’t just about the degree; 
[you] have to be able to talk to people. Long story short, that’s how 
I decided to get [my] degree.
200
 
In addition to master’s degrees, some of the mitigation specialists 
interviewed had other post-graduate education, such as a Ph.D. and/or a 
J.D. Indeed, although the sample of mitigation specialists interviewed in 
this study is not designed to be statistically representative of all mitigation 
specialists working in the United States,
201
 every one of the thirty 
mitigation specialists interviewed had a four-year college degree; 
seventeen also had a master’s degree; two had a Ph.D; and two had a J.D. 
Further evidence of the professionalization of mitigation specialists 
includes the development of a professional group renamed to include 
mitigation specialists. This group, called the National Alliance of 
Sentencing Advocates & Mitigation Specialists (NASAMS), originally 
began in 1992 under the name the National Association of Sentencing 
Advocates (NASA).
202
 Formed in response to a concept paper that 
“recognize[d] the existence of [sentencing advocacy as] a growing 
profession and called for the creation of a professional association to 
support its development,” as NASA it was housed under the auspices of 
The Sentencing Project.
203
 In 2005, it joined the National Legal Aid & 
Defender Association as a section in its Defender Division and changed its 
name to the National Alliance of Sentencing Advocates & Mitigation 
Specialists.
204
 As NASAMS’s website explains:  
NASAMS members now also include mitigation specialists, who 
work to save the lives of defendants facing sentence of death. . . . 
By helping juries that pronounce sentence in death penalty cases to 
 
 
 200. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 49, at 2. 
 201. See discussion of empirical design supra Part II.A; see also supra note 193. 
 202. History of Defense-Based Sentencing Advocacy and NASAMS, NAT’L LEGAL AID & 
DEFENDER ASS’N, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_NASAMS/about_nasams/about_history 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2012). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.  
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understand their clients’ life stories, they argue, often successfully, 
for lifelong prison terms in secure settings instead of the death 
penalty.
205
  
While not all people who work as mitigation specialists belong to 
NASAMS, its decision to rename the organization in order to include 
mitigation specialists gives some an indication of the growing importance 
of mitigation specialists within the field of sentencing advocacy. 
In addition, an American Bar Association subcommittee published a 
report after three years of “attempt[ing] to identify how the mitigation 
function is financed in each jurisdiction” in the United States.206 The 
subcommittee found that “every jurisdiction in the United States that 
authorizes the death penalty has a mechanism to provide mitigation 
specialist services.”207 The fact that every jurisdiction has a mechanism for 
providing mitigation specialist services shows the degree to which states 
recognize the importance of mitigation specialists and the profession of 
capital mitigation specialist. At the same time, as the example from Illinois 
described above illustrates, even when a state has a mechanism for 
providing for mitigation specialist services—as did Illinois208—a critical 
gap may exist between courts’ willingness to provide such services and the 
provision that allows the courts to do it.
209
 The gap between the 
mechanism for providing for mitigation specialist services and courts’ 
willingness to provide such services is explored in more detail later in this 
Article. No matter what the degree of individual state judge commitment 
to the funding and actual appointment of mitigation specialists, however, 
the fact remains that the profession has penetrated state criminal justice 
systems to the point of erecting mechanisms in every state to provide for 
mitigation specialist services.  
 
 
 205. Id.  
 206. Sean D. O’Brien, When Life Depends On It: Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation 
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 698 (2008); id. at 693 
(explaining that the Supplementary Guidelines “are the culmination of three years of work coordinated 
by the Public Interest Litigation Clinic (“PLIC”) and the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of 
Law in cooperation with seasoned capital litigators and mitigation specialists across the United 
States”).  
 207. Id. at 698; see id. at 698 n.23 (explaining that “states use a variety of mechanisms to provide 
mitigation specialist services” and listing states that use state-funded public defenders, states in which 
mitigation specialists are retained using funds in the public defender’s budget, and states that allow the 
court to authorize funds to employ mitigation specialists on motion of defense counsel).  
 208. See id. at 698 n.23 (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/10 (West 2002) to support the 
proposition that Illinois allows the court to authorize funds to employ mitigation specialists on defense 
motion).  
 209. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
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Other evidence of the professionalization of mitigation specialists 
includes the numerous capital defense training programs that have 
emerged to hone skills necessary for effective mitigation investigation.
210
 
In addition to training capital defense attorneys about the importance of 
mitigation and how to integrate mitigation into the entire case (and not just 
the sentencing phase of the trial), these programs now specifically invite 
the entire capital defense team—including the capital defense lawyers, 
mitigation specialists, and investigators—to attend the training together.211 
Other examples of training programs are the formal fellowship and 
internship opportunities that are emerging to provide training opportunities 
for people who hope to become mitigation specialists across the 
country.
212
 While formal fellowships in mitigation investigation are still 
somewhat rare, many of the interviewees reported the critical role that 
informal mentoring opportunities played in their initial development as a 
mitigation specialist. One interviewee also discussed the role that she has 
played as a paid mentor to someone new to the field: 
It’s just an example of how varied the cases can be. It was another 
federal case where the attorney wanted to start a brand-new 
mitigation specialist. He had been working with this agency forever 
and ever, and one of the investigators wanted to break into the 
mitigation field but didn’t have the experience, and so one of the 
attorneys hired me to mentor her. She was getting paid, and I was 
getting paid, and we arranged weekly phone calls where I would 
direct her on everything, and then we arranged for every few 
months she would actually fly here, and we would sit down and go 
over all the documents, and we did really good work together. That 
 
 
 210. For example, the Clarence Darrow Death Penalty Defense College, co-hosted by DePaul 
University College of Law and the University of Michigan Law School, provides individual and group 
training to the defense team—including capital defense attorneys, mitigation specialists, and 
investigators. Darrow Defense College, DEPAUL U. C. L., http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_ 
institutes/cjcc/darrow.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). Another such program is the Death Penalty 
Seminar at Gerry Spence’s Trial Lawyers College at Thunderhead Ranch Campus in DuBois, 
Wyoming. Programs, TRIAL LAW. C., http://www.triallawyerscollege.com/Programs.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2012). Another example is The Bryan R. Shechmeister Death Penalty College hosted by Santa 
Clara University Law School. The Bryan R. Shechmeister Death Penalty College, SANTA CLARA L.: 
HOME FOR DEATH PENALTY C., http://law.scu.edu/dpc/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2012) 
(indicating that it invited mitigation specialists for the first time in 2010 and that it provides “special 
discount prices for non-lawyer team members who register”).  
 211. See supra note 210. 
 212. One such example is the Fair Trial Initiative’s Mitigation Program. “Over the last seven 
years, [it] has trained five mitigation specialists” who are now practicing across the United States. 
Mitigation Program, FAIR TRIAL INITIATIVE, http://www.fairtrial.org/mitigation_program.php (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2012).  
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was such a cool opportunity, and it’s happened in other situations 
too. . . . I love it when they actually will hire you for mentoring of 
new people.
213
  
No matter what the diverse path with which interviewees learned about the 
profession and honed their skills—from discovering the position by 
chance or by specifically seeking mentoring or obtaining a master’s degree 
to practice skills necessary for the profession—the field has continued to 
become more and more professional, as well as professionally recognized, 
in the twenty-six years since Gregg. The next section explores another 
aspect of this professionalization by discussing the role that the American 
Bar Association’s Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Guidelines)
214
 and the 
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams 
in Death Penalty Cases (Supplementary Guidelines)
215
 have played in the 
professionalization of mitigation investigations. 
2. The ABA Guidelines’ Role in Developing Norms 
The Guidelines and Supplementary Guidelines have had a tremendous 
impact on developing norms for the profession of mitigation specialists in 
the short time since their publication. The objective of the 2003 edition of 
the ABA Guidelines is to “set forth a national standard of practice for the 
defense of capital cases in order to ensure high quality legal representation 
for all persons facing the possible imposition or execution of a death 
sentence by any jurisdiction.”216 To achieve this objective, the Guidelines 
strive to provide “comprehensive, up-to-date guidance for professionals 
who work in [the] specialized and demanding field [of capital defense] and 
help[] to ensure effective assistance of counsel for all persons charged 
with or convicted of capital crimes.”217 While the Guidelines existed in 
another form prior to their revision in 2003,
218
 the revision “expanded 
what had been . . . a broad outline of defense counsel’s duties in all 
criminal cases into detailed prescriptions for legal representation of capital 
 
 
 213. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 37, at 4. 
 214. Guidelines, supra note 22.  
 215. Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 23.  
 216. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 919.  
 217. Id. at 916 (Introduction).  
 218. See id. (explaining revision process of the 2003 Guidelines); see also Bobby v. Van Hook, 
130 S. Ct. 13, 16–17 (2009) (per curiam) (discussing history of ABA’s 2003 Guidelines and the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice that preceded them).  
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defendants.”219 In addition to explaining what capital defense attorneys 
must do themselves, the Guidelines “discuss the duty to investigate 
mitigating evidence in exhaustive detail, specifying what attorneys should 
look for, where to look, and when to begin.”220 
Although the 131-page Guidelines are extremely detailed, the 
Supplementary Guidelines were published in 2008 in order to explain with 
even more precision “the elements of the mitigation function of capital 
defense teams.”221 As the Introduction to the Supplementary Guidelines 
explains: 
Because the mitigation function is of utmost importance in the 
defense of capital cases, and because counsel must rely on the 
assistance of experts, investigators and mitigation specialists in 
developing mitigating evidence, these supplementary 
interdisciplinary performance standards are necessary to ensure that 
all members of the defense team perform in accordance with 
prevailing national norms when representing a client who may be 
facing execution.
222
 
In addition to providing comprehensive and contemporary guidance for 
“all members of the defense team,”223 the Supplementary Guidelines strive 
to provide “useful guidance to judges and defense counsel on selecting, 
funding and working with mitigation specialists.”224  
All of the interviewees were asked to comment on the ABA Guidelines 
and Supplementary Guidelines. Nearly every mitigation specialist 
interviewed expressed great familiarity with both documents and said that 
both documents do a good job explaining what mitigation specialists strive 
to accomplish through their investigations. One mitigation specialist even 
suggested that using the Guidelines and Supplementary Guidelines as a 
basis for training would improve the effectiveness of new mitigation 
specialists and would improve attorneys’ understandings of the role of 
mitigation: 
[What] I’d do is training on [the] ABA Guidelines. What is the role, 
what do we do, where do we fit in, how do you fit in with the rest of 
the team. And again, each attorney sees mitigation specialists in a 
 
 
 219. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 17 (comparing the ABA Standards to the revised Guidelines).  
 220. Id. (citing Guidelines, supra note 22). 
 221. See Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 23, at 678. 
 222. Id. at 677. 
 223. Id. at 677–78. 
 224. Id. at 678. 
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different role. . . . Within the ABA Guidelines, it’s no stone 
uncovered. It’s go out and be an investigator, find out about 
everybody, not just our client and their family, but [the] family’s 
family. It’s looking at the microcosm, and the macro—start globally 
with generations, go back, look at neighbors. It’s a very complex 
overview of someone’s life.225 
Similarly, a private mitigation specialist described the Supplementary 
Guidelines as so important to explaining the complexity of her job that she 
purchases copies of the Supplementary Guidelines for every capital 
defense attorney with whom she works: 
Even the attorneys still have to be educated. Every time I join a new 
defense team, I buy them all the volume that has the mitigation stuff 
in it [the Supplementary Guidelines], so that they’ll know (if they 
read it) that that’s what I should be doing. [I] give [it] to the 
attorneys, and it just helps everybody.
226
  
In addition to the interviewees’ descriptions of their reliance on the 
Guidelines
227
 as a baseline for their work and to teach others what their 
work entails, the Guidelines have served as a model for developing similar 
standards, rules, or guidelines in several states.
228
 
Other evidence of the Guidelines’ role in helping to establish prevailing 
professional norms is the degree to which courts have discussed the 
Guidelines when deciding issues relevant to capital defense standards and 
norms. The Illinois and Arizona courts described above are two such 
examples. In addition, the American Bar Association periodically updates 
a list of cases in which courts have cited the Guidelines.
229
 That list 
currently contains 137 published cases in which state or federal courts, 
including the United States Supreme Court, have referred to the 
Guidelines in the context of their opinions.
230
  
 
 
 225. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 1, at 6–7. 
 226. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 37, at 8. 
 227. When discussing their reliance on the Guidelines and the Supplementary Guidelines, 
mitigation specialists referred to both documents as “the Guidelines.” 
 228. See Implementation of the 2003 ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (June 2010) [hereinafter Implementation of the 2003 ABA 
Guidelines], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/DeathPenalty/Representation 
Project/PublicDocuments/Implementation_Fact_Sheet_06_2010_1.authcheckdam.pdf (gathering 
examples of how states are using the Guidelines). 
 229. See List of Cases Citing 2003 ABA Guidelines, http://www2.americanbar.org/DeathPenalty_ 
migrated/RepresentationProject/PublicDocuments/2003List.doc (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). 
 230. Id.  
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Even though the Guidelines may not be “inexorable commands” with 
which capital defense attorneys and mitigation specialists must comply, 
many mitigation specialists reported during their interviews that the 
Guidelines reflect their understanding of prevailing professional norms to 
which they aspire and with which they strive to comply. One mitigation 
specialist described that in addition to the Guidelines, what was especially 
helpful to develop as a mitigation specialist was attending training 
seminars where people from across the country discussed how they 
implement the Guidelines in their work: 
[T]he Guidelines are like, you do all that work, all those cases . . . . 
[It was] so nice to see [at the training] how other people work, 
think, prepare, communicate, do everything—even some of the 
investigators. To me, that was just an eye opener, because we 
operate like this. If that’s all you’re exposed to, you can’t grow. 
And you have to.
231
 
This mitigation specialist learned much from people throughout the 
country who also rely on the Guidelines in their work. In contrast to this 
experience, another mitigation specialist explained that even though the 
Guidelines are understood as establishing prevailing professional norms 
for mitigation investigation nationwide,  
[t]he thing that bothers me about mitigation is I don’t think there’s 
any uniformity in the profession, it’s kind of willy-nilly. Even with 
these mitigation Guidelines, it’s like are people even reading 
them?
232
 
The question of uniformity in standards of practice within the mitigation 
profession highlights tension between the Guidelines’ guidance in 
developing norms and the reality of how mitigation specialists understand 
and implement these norms. The next section examines this tension in 
more detail as it analyzes hurdles that mitigation specialists experience 
throughout their work.  
C. The Fiction of Mitigation  
This section explores hurdles that mitigation specialists experience as 
they strive to emulate prevailing norms of thorough mitigation. While the 
 
 
 231. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 1, at 7. 
 232. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 25, at 13. 
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hurdles they described were wide-ranging,
233
 this section focuses on two 
of the most commonly described experiences: (1) inadequate resources to 
support mitigation and (2) skepticism toward mitigation.  
1. Inadequate Resources to Support Mitigation  
A strong and consistent theme running throughout the interviews was 
the degree to which resources were inadequate to support the work that 
mitigation specialists strove to accomplish. From inadequate funding to 
impossibly heavy caseloads, many mitigation specialists expressed 
frustration that such hurdles prevented them from accomplishing the kind 
of thorough mitigation investigation Supreme Court precedent requires.
234
 
The most extreme resource restriction happened when courts denied 
defense counsel’s motion to appoint and fund mitigation specialists for a 
capital case. In such instances, the mitigation specialists could not work on 
the case, and defense counsel were left to conduct the mitigation 
investigation themselves, even though they had no experience conducting 
mitigation investigations and admitted they did not know how to conduct a 
mitigation investigation. One interviewee described such an experience as 
follows: 
The attorneys called, and they interviewed me for a long time and 
settled on me . . . . [T]hen [I] got word that the judge [had] ruled 
against any mitigation. They said the money bothered the judge, and 
I said of course it did, and it should . . . because it should be 
expensive, and if they don’t want to pay the money for good 
representation, then they should take death off the table. But that’s 
what the attorney just said—the judge said that, oh, you two are 
experienced attorneys, you can do it. They have no experience in 
mitigation. They’ve got lawyer things to do, and I’m just appalled at 
it. [The judge] said the ABA Guidelines are just guidelines, so 
we’re not required to have a mitigation specialist. That’s what the 
judge said. [The attorneys] have no idea what they’re doing [trying 
to investigate mitigation]; it’s awful.235  
 
 
 233. Some of the other hurdles most frequently described included ethical dilemmas they had to 
navigate and communication issues pertaining to the capital defense team. These areas are beyond the 
scope of this Article and will be discussed in forthcoming work.  
 234. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the second wave of Supreme Court precedent, 
from 2000 through the Court’s 2009–2010 term).  
 235. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 37, at 1. 
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This interviewee’s experience demonstrates how even though written rules 
and procedures may indicate that “every jurisdiction . . . that authorizes the 
death penalty has a mechanism to provide mitigation specialist 
services,”236 the reality in some jurisdictions—such as the one in which the 
interviewee was denied appointment as a mitigation specialist—is that the 
state procedures authorizing funding for mitigation specialists are not 
always followed.  
While denying appointment to a case is the ultimate form of resource 
restriction, mitigation funding was restricted in other ways that 
interviewees found similarly destructive to their ability to do their job. For 
example, other mitigation specialists described the experience of being 
appointed to a case and not being allotted a sufficient budget to do what 
they needed to do. While acknowledging their individual obligation to 
submit a budget and try to stay within that budget, one mitigation 
specialist explained that the process was not as simple as submitting a 
single budget for every expense expected to be incurred during the course 
of the mitigation investigation. As that interviewee explained, in some 
jurisdictions the assumption is that the initial budget is just an estimate and 
that attorneys can seek further funding when necessary, but that 
assumption does not always work out in the mitigation specialist’s 
interests. 
I’m [significantly] over budget. . . . I was just doing the work. So 
I’ve got a call into [the attorney] because I’ve got a lot more to do, 
and I’m already . . . over budget. . . . By and large, attorneys do not 
understand how long it takes and how much goes into this, so they 
shortcut you all the time. [The attorney] only got me approved for [a 
certain amount] going through trial. Generally, an attorney will 
approve you for a certain amount and then go back and get more.
237
 
Other mitigation specialists described different funding hurdles, such as 
the fact that when a mitigation specialist is appointed on a military capital 
case, the government—rather than a non-interested party—reviews and 
approves all funding requests that the mitigation specialist submits.
238
 In 
contrast to non-military capital trials, where funds are provided through ex 
parte motions to the court or through neutral entities,
239
 having the 
government approve the mitigation specialist’s expenses means that the 
 
 
 236. O’Brien, supra note 206, at 698. 
 237. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 25, at 5. 
 238. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 37, at 2. 
 239. See O’Brien, supra note 206, at 698 n.23 (listing mechanisms of funding for all fifty states).  
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government knows every expert with whom the mitigation specialist has 
consulted (even if that expert is not called to testify at trial), as well as 
everywhere the mitigation specialist has traveled in search of mitigation 
evidence.  
[T]he government gets to know everything you’re doing. They’re 
the ones who get to approve of all the stuff you have to do, and the 
travel, so they always get to know where you’re going. That was 
just so weird and creepy.
240
  
While many mitigation specialists provided various descriptions of 
mechanisms that restricted or administered funding in a way that 
hampered the mitigation specialist’s ability to perform fully, some of these 
same mitigation specialists experienced no funding difficulties in other 
cases.
241
 In addition, two mitigation specialists described receiving 
sufficient funding all of the time, as they worked full caseloads that 
consisted of one case at a time. One of these mitigation specialists 
explained: 
Just for me, they set aside [a specific amount for the case]. Just for 
me to work this case, and I work it full time. [O]ther mitigators 
maybe have ten cases that they’re juggling at a time; I work one, 
and I work it . . . solid, and then it goes away. And the client, nine 
out of ten times, pleads guilty and gets life.
242
 
The other mitigation specialist who carried only one case at a time as a full 
caseload described never having the court cut or trim the bills that were 
submitted, never being capped in the full amount of expenses incurred 
during the course of the investigation, and being paid relatively reliably by 
both the federal court and the local public defender office (depending on 
whether the case was a federal or state capital case).
243
 
While these two mitigation specialists had full caseloads consisting of 
one case at a time, other mitigation specialists handled multiple cases 
simultaneously. Although not all mitigation specialists who carry one case 
at a time are in private practice, one mitigation specialist who carried 
multiple cases reflected the following:  
 
 
 240. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 37, at 2. 
 241. See, e.g., Interview with Mitigation Specialist 25, at 5–6. 
 242. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 5, at 2. 
 243. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 40, at 3 (explaining that it sometimes took “months” to 
get paid by the federal court but that the local public defender office, who funded the mitigation in the 
state capital cases, was “really good” about punctual reimbursement).  
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some people are in private practice, have grant money, can pick and 
choose cases, do one case at a time. [I] just came from a seminar. 
They brought different people in from the U.S.—attorneys to 
investigators to mitigation people—they all thought the norm[] was 
one case at a time, that’s all you can do. And I thought, we have 
four.
244
  
Another interviewee who was carrying several cases at once explained that 
part of the reason this was possible was because the cases were at different 
stages in the litigation process (such as brand new or pending trial) and it 
often took several years to reach trial.
245
 Another reason was that 
sometimes one mitigation specialist might take over the case from another 
mitigation specialist who purported that the investigation was virtually 
done, when in fact, little to no work had been done on the case: 
Right now I have nine [cases], still more than I’d like. Five to six 
[cases] would be ideal. At one point I had [even more]. Now that 
was when cases were taking five to six years to go to trial, and so 
. . . a lot of the cases I had were conflicted off, some mitigation had 
been started, or the prior mitigation specialist quit. So this is where 
you get a different opinion of what constitutes mitigation. I [had] 
one [mitigation specialist] who said, “It’s 95% done,” and there 
were no records, no nothing. So that’s one thing about mitigation, 
it’s still—I think the Guidelines are pretty clear, but there’s a 
considerable variation amongst people, approaches.
246
 
These comments reflect the variation in caseloads that mitigation 
specialists carry as well as the variation in work product that mitigation 
specialists produce.  
Although poor mitigation investigation should ideally self-correct 
under the supervision of the lead capital defense attorney, as the next 
section explains, many of the mitigation specialists witnessed ineffective 
assistance of counsel by the attorneys for whom they worked. This 
ineffectiveness sometimes took the form of skepticism toward the concept 
of mitigation.  
 
 
 244. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 1, at 7. 
 245. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 18, at 1. 
 246. Id. 
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2. Skepticism Toward Mitigation 
Mitigation specialists relayed many positive experiences describing 
dedicated capital defense attorneys who worked hard to provide excellent 
defense at the sentencing phase of the capital trial. Such experiences 
provide hope that mitigation can temper the arbitrary imposition of death 
by providing the opportunity for jurors to evaluate the particular life 
circumstances of the capital defendant in order to decide what sentence to 
impose. At the same time that such experiences provide hope for 
mitigation, mitigation specialists also described experiences where 
attorneys did not understand what mitigation evidence involved and were 
not open to learning about it. They also described working with attorneys 
who held such skepticism about the concept of mitigation that it interfered 
with the attorneys’ ability to mount an effective defense against the death 
penalty.  
Other mitigation specialists described working with attorneys who did 
not understand how to present mitigating evidence to a jury, and this 
ineptness interfered with the jury’s ability to understand why the 
mitigating evidence was relevant to the jury’s decision about whether to 
render a death sentence.
247
 In other instances, the attorneys’ inability to 
understand mitigation took the form of not establishing a relationship with 
the client, which prevented the attorneys from conveying to the jury why 
their client’s life was worth saving. As an example of this behavior, one 
mitigation specialist described working with an attorney for five years on a 
capital case. The case ultimately resulted in a death sentence, and the 
attorney had only visited the client once a year prior to the case going to 
trial:  
I had a case that the attorney . . . would see his client once a year. 
And it got to be a joke between myself and the client, that it’s about 
time for his annual visit.
248
 
Although this case resulted in death and the mitigation specialist 
documented through notes what the attorney did not do when preparing for 
 
 
 247. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 1, at 8 (explaining that rather than call to the stand 
numerous witnesses whom the mitigation expert had found so that different people who could convey 
stories about the client in their own words, the attorney ordered the mitigation specialist to compress 
the mitigation evidence into a single PowerPoint presentation that was presented through the 
mitigation specialist’s own testimony: “So I’m there on the stand, telling his life with a PowerPoint 
that—the jury couldn’t care less. It was just hard.”).  
 248. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 20, at 7. 
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trial, the case has not been reversed on appeal or through post-conviction 
relief.
249
 
Even if such a case is ultimately reversed and results in a new trial, the 
mitigation specialists explained their frustration with the fact that capital 
clients must stay on death row for years before obtaining relief because 
they were appointed an attorney who did not understand mitigation or who 
was resistant to mitigation:  
[I]t’s difficult, because the attorneys run the show, and I can express 
my concern, and I can jump up and down, and I can wave my arms, 
and I can holler, and at the end of the day, the attorneys run the 
show. And that’s one of the more frustrating things about this job—
and the response I generally get from supervisors and from 
management—well, you’ll have your chance at the IAC [the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim]. You’ll have your chance 
when it comes back, and there’s an IAC complaint or an IAC 
hearing. I don’t want that to happen in the first place. In the 
meantime, my client’s been on death row for . . . years.250 
In this way, mitigation specialists expressed concern that a capital 
client would have to linger on death row for many years before an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim could be heard—let alone whether 
that claim would ultimately result in relief. In addition to this concern, the 
mitigation specialist interviewed above also described the difficult 
position that the mitigation specialist would be in during the ineffective 
assistance of counsel hearing: 
I would be in a very uncomfortable position if I’m called to testify 
[at the IAC hearing], because there is an IAC complaint or a bar 
complaint, when I have to come back in [to] that office and work 
 
 
 249. Id. 
 250. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 35, at 2; see also Dan Barry, In the Rearview Mirror, 
Oklahoma and a Life on Its Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A1. Barry describes the recent 
case of James Fisher, a capital defendant in Oklahoma sentenced to death who remained on death row 
for nineteen years before his case was reversed because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. As an 
example of the ineffective assistance of counsel Fisher received, Barry cites the court’s own 
description of the trial: “When the time came at sentencing to plead for mercy . . . [the attorney] 
uttered just nine words. Four were judicial pleasantries; the remaining five formed a lame objection to 
the prosecution’s closing argument.” Id. During his retrial in 2005, Fisher again received ineffective 
assistance of counsel (his second attorney “all but ignored the many boxes of defense material 
concerning Mr. Fisher’s case”). Although Fisher’s second death conviction was overturned more 
quickly than his first, as his case was set for a third trial, the prosecution and the defense reached a 
resolution of the twenty-eight-year-old case which allowed Mr. Fisher to be immediately released, 
with the understanding that he never return to Oklahoma. Id.  
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with that attorney for the next day, week, year. That’s not a good 
thing.
251
  
Rather than wait until years down the road to potentially rectify difficulties 
the attorneys are experiencing in understanding mitigation or in remaining 
skeptical about mitigation, mitigation specialists strove to point attorneys 
and courts to the ABA Guidelines so that everyone could better understand 
mitigation in the first place.  
When doing this, some mitigation specialists returned to the theme of 
the tension they experienced between courts relying on the Guidelines and 
courts distancing themselves from the Guidelines. Although the Guidelines 
are what the mitigation specialists themselves follow in order to do their 
jobs to the best of their abilities, they sometimes ran into courts that 
downplayed the relevance of the Guidelines. To rectify this situation, one 
mitigation specialist explained the hope that the  
ABA Guidelines could be viewed not as just guidelines, but could 
be used by judges as the actual performance standard for mitigation 
specialists. This is what we follow. Obviously, the judges are not 
educated. Even the attorneys still need to be educated.
252
  
While the experience above illustrates an example of judges not 
understanding what mitigation specialists do and what mitigation 
investigation entails—and the wish that the Guidelines would be used to 
help educate them—another mitigation specialist described the opposite 
experience. That mitigation specialist was recently appointed to a capital 
case through the strong encouragement of the judge presiding over the 
case. The capital attorneys assigned to the case had been working on the 
case for a year without the help of a mitigation specialist because defense 
counsel did not “believe in” mitigation.253 After a year of working without 
a mitigation specialist, defense counsel finally sought appointment of a 
mitigation specialist as the result of the judge “strongly encouraging” them 
to do so.
254
 Without such strong encouragement from the trial judge to 
appoint a mitigation specialist, the mitigation specialist firmly believes the 
attorneys would not have done so.
255
  
The contrast between a judge strongly encouraging attorneys to seek 
the appointment of a mitigation specialist and a judge denying defense 
 
 
 251. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 35, at 2. 
 252. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 37, at 8. 
 253. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 40, at 3–4. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
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counsel’s motion to appoint a mitigation specialist could not be more 
stark. Between these two extremes remain a variety of other hurdles that 
mitigation specialists experience while trying to render thorough 
mitigation investigation—from funding difficulties, to attorneys who do 
not understand mitigation, to attorneys who do not “believe” in it. While 
the Court has made clear that variation between jurisdictions’ death 
penalty procedures is acceptable, the degree of variance illustrated through 
the experiences of mitigation specialists interviewed in this research 
indicates the need to examine the arbitrariness of the system as a whole. 
To this end, Part III explores the possibilities and limitations of mitigation 
helping to achieve justice in the administration of the death penalty.  
III. THE ARBITRARY IMPOSITION OF DEATH 
The research presented in this Article suggests that the arbitrariness the 
Court strove to temper after Furman has not been realized. Read together, 
Parts I and II highlight circumstances in which the reality of capital 
mitigation investigation often falls short of what is required under the 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The qualitative data reveal 
ways that arbitrariness continues to pervade the nation’s death penalty 
systems. 
Justice White’s concurrence in Furman therefore continues to resonate. 
“Legislative ‘policy,’” he wrote, is “necessarily defined not by what is 
legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising the 
discretion so regularly conferred upon them.”256 The cases and interviews 
documented in this Article illustrate that even though mitigation 
investigation and advocacy are required by legislation nationwide, judges, 
attorneys, and mitigation specialists often implement that legislation in 
arbitrary ways.  
A. Evidence of Arbitrariness 
The experiences of the mitigation specialists interviewed through this 
research reveal that the absence of national consistency in understanding 
what constitutes thorough capital mitigation can lead to wide disparity in 
mitigation investigations and advocacy. The research also suggests that 
arbitrary professional norms within mitigation investigations and advocacy 
may introduce arbitrariness into the administration of the death penalty. 
For example, the interviews in this research reveal instances in which 
 
 
 256. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (per curiam). 
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mitigation specialists, defense attorneys, and judges misunderstood what 
thorough mitigation investigation involved. Such misunderstandings can 
impact a capital defendant’s ability to receive a non-arbitrary sentence of 
death. 
From denial of appointment in a capital case because the state court 
believed the attorneys could do the investigation themselves,
257
 to a state 
court who “strongly encouraged” capital defense counsel to hire a capital 
mitigation specialist (even though defense counsel had themselves not 
sought a capital mitigation specialist to help them during the year they had 
been working on a capital client’s case because defense counsel did not 
“believe in” mitigation258), this research suggests that the expertise of the 
capital judge has an impact on the capital defendant’s ability to receive a 
fair trial. Because of the wide disparity in expertise and training among 
judges presiding over capital trials, some capital defendants may have the 
assistance of a capital mitigation specialist and some may not. Such wide 
disparity in access to expertise from mitigation specialists is one way that 
arbitrariness may be introduced into the death penalty system. 
Another way that arbitrariness can infiltrate the administration of the 
death penalty is reflected in the wide misunderstanding of what constitutes 
thorough mitigation investigation. The experience of the mitigation 
specialist who took over a case from another mitigation specialist who 
promised the investigation was “95% done”259—only to discover that 
virtually no investigation had been conducted whatsoever—is one 
example of the gaping differences in performing thorough mitigation 
investigation. Such differences mean that the mere act of assigning a 
mitigation specialist to a case does not automatically eliminate the 
arbitrary imposition of death. Without a common understanding of 
prevailing professional norms in capital mitigation investigation, a capital 
defendant will not receive effective assistance of counsel when the capital 
defense attorney erroneously relies on the work of a mitigation specialist 
who does not understand what constitutes thorough mitigation 
investigation. 
This misunderstanding of the role of the mitigation specialist and of 
what constitutes thorough mitigation investigation is further illustrated by 
the cases examined through this research. Post-Furman Supreme Court 
precedent, beginning with Gregg, Woodson, and Lockett and extending 
 
 
 257. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 37, at 1; see supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 258. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 40, at 3–4; see supra notes 253–54 and acompanying 
text. 
 259. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 18, at 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] ARBITRARY DEATH 629 
 
 
 
 
through the six cases published during the Court’s 2009–2010 term, 
establish the Court’s mandate that thorough mitigation investigation is a 
critical component of a constitutional death sentence.
260
 Despite the 
Court’s emphasis on thorough mitigation investigation, however, state 
courts are rendering divergent interpretations of the Court’s precedent, as 
evidenced by the juxtaposition of state court opinions from Illinois and 
Arizona. The Illinois trial court presiding in People v. Taylor examined the 
Court’s precedent and Illinois state court opinions interpreting the Court’s 
precedent to decide that Taylor’s attorneys could conduct a thorough 
mitigation investigation themselves and did not need a capital mitigation 
specialist to help them.
261
 When an Arizona post-conviction court 
interpreted the same Supreme Court precedent (in addition to other Court 
cases issued since Taylor was decided in the summer of 2009), the 
Arizona court found that the Supreme Court had suggested that a capital 
mitigation specialist was important.
262
 After reviewing Arizona state 
precedent as well, the court found that an “adequately-funded mitigation 
investigation was a constitutionally-required and essential defense tool”263 
and that hiring a capital mitigation specialist to help conduct such a 
mitigation investigation was part of the prevailing professional norms in 
capital litigation.
264
 While the divergent results in Illinois and Arizona are 
not per se evidence of arbitrariness within the states’ death penalty 
systems, they suggest arbitrariness.  
In addition to the Court’s precedent striving to provide guidance to 
lower courts as they establish—however divergently—what constitutes a 
thorough mitigation investigation, the ABA Guidelines also strive to 
temper arbitrariness by providing guidance. They do this by setting forth 
“a national standard of practice for the defense of capital cases in order to 
ensure high quality legal representation for all persons facing the possible 
imposition or execution of a death sentence by any jurisdiction.”265 The 
Guidelines’ clarity and thoroughness has helped to establish what 
constitutes thorough mitigation investigation and capital defense 
advocacy.
266
 At the same time, the Supreme Court’s reference to the ABA 
 
 
 260. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the second wave of Supreme Court precedent, 
from 2000 through the Court’s 2009–2010 term).  
 261. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 262. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 263. State v. Sharp, Case No. CR95000271, slip op. at 15 (Ariz. Super. Ct. July 29, 2010) 
(footnote omitted) (discussing State v. Bocharski, 22 P.3d 43 (Ariz. 2001)).  
 264. Id.  
 265. Guidelines, supra note 22, at 919. 
 266. See Implementation of the 2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 228. 
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Guidelines as “‘only guides’ to what reasonableness means, not its 
definition,”267 has underscored the States’ freedom to “impose whatever 
specific rules they see fit to ensure that criminal defendants are well 
represented . . . [provided that] counsel make objectively reasonable 
choices.”268 Without consistency in enforcing the prevailing professional 
norms clarified through the Guidelines, inconsistent understandings of 
what constitutes thorough mitigation investigation will continue to 
contribute to the arbitrariness with which defendants receive the death 
penalty.  
The evidence of wide disparities illustrated by the examples in this 
Article suggests ways in which arbitrariness continues to infiltrate the 
administration of the death penalty. When courts agree on prevailing 
professional norms in capital mitigation investigation, courts take one-step 
closer to fulfilling the hope of mitigation. When courts disagree on 
prevailing professional norms, courts take one-step away from reducing 
arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty.  
B. Possibilities for Reform 
Evidence of arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty 
raises questions about what should be done. Is it possible to achieve justice 
through further reform of death penalty systems, or is it only possible to 
achieve justice through other means? Although this Article is not designed 
to set forth an agenda for law reform, the mitigation specialists’ own 
analyses of what is working and not working within capital mitigation 
investigations and advocacy suggests some possibilities for reform. 
1. Justice Through Mitigation 
One way to move beyond the arbitrariness of the death penalty is to 
further study and emulate ways in which mitigation investigations and 
advocacy are operating as the Supreme Court intended. In such instances, 
mitigation works as a means to ensure “the fundamental respect for 
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment” by requiring “consideration 
of the character and record of the individual offender and the 
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable 
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”269 By studying 
 
 
 267. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2009) (per curiam)). 
 268. Id. (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000)). 
 269. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
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examples where mitigation investigations and advocacy do in fact succeed 
in tempering arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty, ideas 
for reform emerge that could be implemented nationally.  
A mitigation specialist who has worked on both state and federal 
capital cases suggested one such idea. That mitigation specialist described 
the benefit of having access to the expertise of “federal resource 
councils”—experts in capital defense who are assigned regionally to 
provide additional support and guidance to people working on federal 
capital defense teams. According to the mitigation specialist:  
I just think [regional resource councils are] fabulous. I just love 
working with them. I love listening to their ideas. I’m going to a 
federal training in [a certain state] in a couple of weeks that is by 
invitation only for the worst twenty federal cases this year. We send 
our information in advance, and they take them very seriously, and 
they brainstorm the cases with us, and help us through everything 
that we need to think through.
270
  
Based on this mitigation specialist’s positive experience working with 
federal resource councils who teach the entire capital defense team 
(including defense lawyers, regular investigators, and mitigation 
specialists), the mitigation specialist suggested that such an idea could be 
implemented on a regional basis to improve mitigation investigations and 
advocacy nationwide: 
It seems to me that there should be a similar resource available to 
the state, and it wouldn’t just have to be state by state, that every 
state has to have their own . . . . But I just think more willingness to 
talk, to share, to assume that this is not just a local problem would 
[be] benefi[cial] . . . . So I guess I would say that my dream would 
be that there would be . . . a resource council for each state . . . . I 
always think that people learn better in groups. That’s what I would 
like to see.
271
 
In the same way that many mitigation specialists suggested better training 
opportunities for all members of the capital defense team, so did many 
mitigation specialists suggest improved training for judges who preside 
over capital trials. In the words of a mitigation specialist who had worked 
 
 
 270. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 48, at 11. 
 271. Id. 
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on capital defense teams appearing in front of judges who did not seem to 
understand what mitigation was and what capital mitigation specialists do: 
The one thing that comes to mind . . . is more training for judges. In 
a couple of areas: one, to help them understand what it is that a 
mitigation specialist does. Then help them understand why it’s 
important that there is a mitigation specialist on the team . . . and 
also to help them understand how you cannot do a complete and 
thorough mitigation investigation in 100 hours, or 200 hours, or 300 
hours—that it takes a lengthy period of time, and there are certain 
things that need to occur in order to get the information you need to 
get to develop the puzzle of this person’s life. So I think those basic 
areas are very important for judges to understand.
272
  
Other mitigation specialists also emphasized the idea of providing better 
training to judges while acknowledging that improved training would only 
indirectly help to improve the administration of the death penalty system: 
Sadly, it indirectly has an impact, but I would like the judges to 
have better training. They are putting judges in positions to officiate 
over death penalty cases that they are not qualified to be doing. 
They have not been on the criminal bench long enough, they don’t 
really have a good grasp of death penalty law, it’s very different. I’d 
like to see them get better training.
273
 
In addition to the ideas that mitigation specialists suggested to improve 
training for judges and all members of the capital defense team, the recent 
Arizona Superior Court decision, State v. Sharp,
274
 represents another 
action that state courts could take to temper the arbitrariness of capital 
mitigation investigations. State courts could recognize that mitigation 
investigation performed by a qualified mitigation specialist is required. In 
reaching this result, the Sharp court acknowledged that although the 
United States Supreme Court has not specifically stated “that a mitigation 
specialist must be on board to conduct that investigation,”275 two passages 
from the Court’s precedent, in Van Hook and Wiggins, are “suggestive” of 
such a result.
276
 In addition, the Arizona court relied on its own state court 
 
 
 272. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 2, at 6. 
 273. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 23, at 5. 
 274. State v. Sharp, Case No. CR95000271 (Ariz. Super. Ct. July 29, 2010). 
 275. Id., slip op. at 14. 
 276. Id. (citing Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510 (2003)). 
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precedent as further support for requiring a mitigation specialist. Other 
states could undertake similar analyses, and absent relevant precedent in 
their own state, they could cite Arizona’s example as evidence of evolving 
professional norms emerging throughout the states.  
Alternatively, the United States Supreme Court could decide that the 
right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right for defense 
counsel to obtain the expert help of a mitigation specialist. Indeed, a 
number of scholars have suggested such a reform.
277
 Other scholars have 
suggested a variation of this reform by recommending that the Strickland 
standard evolve to reflect the defense attorney’s performance at the 
penalty stage of a capital case.
278
 Still another way to achieve reform is 
envisioned by Jordan M. Steiker, who argues for improving representation 
in capital cases by promoting structural reform within states.
279
  
Another idea for reform is to implement the ABA Guidelines as rules 
or standards to guide defense attorneys across the country. Many of the 
mitigation specialists stressed the important role the Guidelines serve in 
their daily work, as well as their frustration that judges and defense 
counsel remain unfamiliar with the Guidelines. One mitigation specialist 
explained: 
[The Guidelines are] probably one of the best things we have going 
for us now. That’s where it all starts, and that’s why we try to 
incorporate it into our affidavit, so [the judge and defense counsel] 
understand what it means for us to do a client interview, a family 
interview, what record management means. I’ve turned to those 
many different times, even in trying to get certain records for a 
client or family members. I would copy and highlight whatever 
 
 
 277. See, e.g., Lieutenant J. Michael Montgomery, Death is Different: Kreutzer and the Right to a 
Mitigation Specialist in Military Capital Offense Cases, ARMY LAW., Feb. 2007, at 13; Daniel L. 
Payne, Building the Case for Life: A Mitigation Specialist as a Necessity and a Matter of Right, 16 
CAP. DEF. J. 43 (2003). 
 278. Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of 
Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323 (conveying an argument that preceded—and in some ways, 
anticipated—the Court’s recent decisions in cases such as Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla); see also 
Jeffrey Levinson, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 178 (2001) (arguing that “improvement in the standards for 
effective assistance of counsel for the capital penalty phase will work towards ending the freakish and 
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 279. Jordan M. Steiker, Improving Representation in Capital Cases: Establishing the Right 
Baselines in Federal Habeas to Promote Structural Reform Within States, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293 
(2007). Steiker recommends “rejecting the Court’s overly deferential standard of review reflected in 
Strickland . . . and . . . refusing to accept the judicial and legislative baseline of no right to effective 
representation in state post-conviction.” Id. at 312.  
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passage I needed and include it with the request, so I was educating 
different people throughout the process.
280
 
In order to more widely implement the Guidelines’ reach, state bar 
associations, state defender organizations, or state supreme courts could 
adopt the Guidelines within their individual states. For example, in 2008, 
the Nevada Supreme Court issued new standards that “substantially 
conform to the 2003 ABA Guidelines.”281 Similarly, the Arizona Supreme 
Court amended the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2006 to 
require that death counsel “be guided by and familiar with” the ABA 
Guidelines.
282
 Also in 2006, the Texas Bar Association adopted a version 
of the Guidelines.
283
 And the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council 
adopted a version of the ABA Guidelines in 2005.
284
 If each state were to 
undertake similar steps to adopt the ABA Guidelines, the prevailing 
professional norms for thorough mitigation investigation would be 
consistent throughout the states.  
Just as individual states could mirror the ABA Guidelines and 
Supplementary Guidelines, so could the United States Supreme Court 
more decisively embrace both documents as evidence of prevailing 
professional norms in capital defense. While Van Hook left open the 
possibility of the Court doing this in a future case, the Court also conveyed 
cross signals about the weight that the Guidelines carry.
285
 If mitigation is 
to operate non-arbitrarily nationwide, then the Court’s recognition of the 
Guidelines’ role in establishing professional norms in capital litigation 
would help achieve more uniformity in mitigation investigation and 
advocacy. If implemented, such ideas for reform would improve capital 
representation and capital mitigation investigation within the individual 
states. Whether these improvements would ultimately succeed in 
tempering residual arbitrariness within the death penalty system would 
remain to be seen.  
 
 
 280. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 46, at 5. 
 281. See Implementation of the 2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 228, at 3 (citing In the Matter 
of the Review of Issues Concerning Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal and Juvenile 
Delinquency Cases, ADKT No. 411 (Nev. Jan. 04, 2008)). In addition to these examples, other 
examples include the Alabama Circuit Court Judges Conference adopting the ABA Guidelines by 
resolution in 2005, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers adopting the ABA 
Guidelines in 2003, and the Department for Public Advocacy for the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
adopting the ABA Guidelines in 2003. Id. at 4. 
 282. Id. at 3 (citing ARIZ. R. CRIM. PROC. 6.8 (West 1998 & Supp. 2011)). 
 283. Id.  
 284. Id.  
 285. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2009) (per curiam). 
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In lieu of reforms that strive to improve existing death penalty systems 
by affecting the level of capital representation within those systems, an 
entirely different strategy is to envision justice beyond the confines of 
existing state systems. The final section does just this. 
2. Justice Beyond Mitigation 
Instead of reforms that strive to improve existing state systems, another 
course of action would be for individual states to look beyond using 
mitigation as a means to achieve justice. In the absence of clear choices for 
alternative systems that achieve justice in the imposition of death, states 
might choose to impose state moratoriums on executions. Former 
Governor George Ryan made Illinois one of the most famous examples of 
this strategy when he commissioned a study of the state’s death penalty 
system. Governor Ryan then pardoned four individuals who had been 
erroneously sentenced to death and commuted the sentences of every other 
individual on Illinois’ death row because he believed that Illinois’ capital 
punishment system was fundamentally flawed and unfair.
286
 
Another course of action would be for the Supreme Court to declare, as 
it did in Furman, that current death penalty systems do not guard against 
arbitrariness and are therefore unconstitutional, so states must go back to 
the drawing board and revise their statutes yet again if they wish to 
continue administering the death penalty.
287
 Such action would constitute a 
de facto moratorium on the death penalty that would drive individual 
states to seriously study their state procedures in order to make changes 
geared toward tempering existing arbitrariness within their systems.  
A still more extreme reform would be for individual states or for the 
Supreme Court to abolish the death penalty. In so doing, they could adopt 
Justice Blackmun’s declaration from his famous dissent from denial of 
certiorari in Callins v. Collins,
288
 that after decades of “[tinkering] with the 
machinery of death,” he felt “morally and intellectually obligated simply 
to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed” and that it was 
“virtually self-evident to [him] now that no combination of procedural 
rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its 
 
 
 286. Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at A1 (explaining that Governor Ryan’s condemnation of Illinois’ capital 
punishment system as fundamentally flawed and unfair was the reason for Ryan’s decision to conduct 
the “largest such emptying of death row in history”).  
 287. See discussion supra Part I.A.1. 
 288. 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
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inherent constitutional deficiencies.”289 Indeed, three states have recently 
abolished the death penalty because they found it impossible to provide 
sufficient resources to safeguard against constitutional deficiencies in their 
death penalty systems.
290
 And even more recently, on March 9, 2011, 
Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed legislation abolishing the death penalty 
in Illinois.
291
  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented original empirical research suggesting that 
mitigation has not tempered the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. 
Although the Supreme Court has assumed that a jury’s consideration of 
mitigating evidence would help to ensure that capital defendants are not 
sentenced to death arbitrarily, this research suggests that such an 
assumption is deeply flawed. Indeed, the experiences of mitigation 
specialists highlight ways in which mitigation introduces new forms of 
arbitrariness into the system, rather than alleviating it.  
The empirical research presented in this Article thus reveals that 
disparities in the kinds of mitigation investigations individual defendants 
receive are much more serious than previously thought. The Supreme 
Court has already highlighted deficiencies in the way that mitigation 
investigations and advocacy are conducted.
292
 Similarly, the American Bar 
Association has expressed concern regarding “the overall fairness and 
accuracy of capital punishment systems in the [United States].”293 Many of 
the mitigation specialists I interviewed voiced similar concerns, and my 
 
 
 289. Id. at 1145. 
 290. The three states that have abandoned capital punishments systems in the last three years are 
New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), and New York (2007). See Death Penalty Abolished in New 
Mexico—Governor Says Repeal Will Make the State Safer, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-abolished-new-mexico-governor-says-repeal-will-
make-state-safer (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). New Mexico’s move toward abolition began when New 
Mexico prosecutors dropped death penalty charges against three inmates who had killed a prison guard 
because the “defense ran out of money.” Steve Mills, Cost Is Slowly Killing Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 8, 2009, at C10. Prior to prosecutors dropping the capital charges, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court had ruled that state prosecutors “could not seek a death sentence until the lawyers were paid.” 
Id. In discussing the prosecutors’ decision to forego capital charges, New Mexico Attorney General 
Gary King surmised at the time that “[u]nless the legislature is willing to appropriate a lot of money 
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empirical research suggests that the problems are more systemic than 
previously acknowledged.  
Convincing a jury to punish a defendant with a non-death sentence 
instead of death is not the hallmark of constitutionally effective mitigation. 
When capital mitigation works as the Supreme Court intended—as a way 
to ensure that the jury considers any aspect of a defendant’s character or 
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death—then capital mitigation 
has succeeded in tempering the arbitrary imposition of death, even if death 
is imposed. In the words of one mitigation specialist,  
[W]ell, we don’t win very often—you redefine success . . . . When 
you go to court . . . or you show up to the client’s visit when you 
say you’re going to, they start to really feel believed in and 
understood, and they change. You see a shift in them, and you see a 
light go on, where they feel like someone cares, finally. And . . . 
they say thank you when it’s all over with . . . thank you so much 
for working so hard and for caring so much, and for fighting for 
[their] life, even when I didn’t want you to, thank you, [I] changed 
[their] life forever.
294
 
Until mitigation operates nationwide as a means to temper the arbitrary 
imposition of death, capital defendants will continue to be sentenced to 
death in an arbitrary manner that does not comport with fundamental 
notions of human decency. States must ensure that all defendants receive 
constitutionally sound mitigation investigations and advocacy, or they 
must acknowledge the continuing arbitrariness of capital sentencing 
decisions. Capital defendants’ access to constitutionally sound mitigation 
investigations must therefore be reformed if the investigations are to help 
to eliminate arbitrariness in capital punishment decisions. Without such 
reform, the death penalty will remain unconstitutionally arbitrary despite 
mitigation.  
 
 
 294. Interview with Mitigation Specialist 34, at 4. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
